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INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN
PARENTAL-RIGHTS TERMINATION CASES: THE
CHALLENGE FOR APPELLATE COURTS
Susan Calkins*
I. INTRODUCTION
Appellate courts are increasingly presented with claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel in proceedings that involve the
termination of parental rights. These claims grow out of the
burgeoning number of parental-rights termination petitions filed
in the trial courts since the Adoption and Safe Families Act of
1997' became law. The ASFA is designed, among other things,
* The author is an associate justice of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court who previously
served as a trial judge for eighteen years. This article is adapted from a thesis written in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for a degree of Master of Laws in the Judicial
Process at the University of Virginia School of Law.
1. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) (available at
http://uscode.house.gov). For a concise background of ASFA and a brief history of national
child welfare policy, see Mary O'Flynn, The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997:
Changing Child Welfare Policy Without Addressing Parental Substance Abuse, 16 J.
Contemp. Health L. & Policy 243, 248-57 (1999). For additional background on the
ASFA's requirement that termination proceedings must be initiated within strict time
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to promote the adoption of foster children, 2 and termination
proceedings must be initiated in order to free those children for
adoption.
3
In almost every state parents have a right to counsel when
the state seeks to terminate their parental rights. The vast
majority of parents in termination proceedings are indigent,
which often means that their counsel is appointed by the court or
provided through a public defender or contract system. The
representation of parents by overworked and underpaid
attorneys results in claims by parents that their counsel was
ineffective.
This article explores both the procedural vehicles and the
substantive standards adopted by appellate courts for claims of
ineffective assistance when such claims are brought by parents
seeking to vacate or reopen judgments terminating their parental
rights. I start by briefly describing the process of a typical
parental-rights termination case. Next, I discuss the Supreme
Court's view of the right to counsel in parental-termination
cases and the status of the parent's right to counsel in the various
states. I then analyze the procedures used by the courts to review
a claim of ineffective assistance, and I suggest the procedure
that I believe to be the most productive and efficient given the
interests of the parents and the needs of the children. Next, I turn
to the substantive standard for determining whether counsel is
limits, see Madelyn Freundlich, Expediting Termination of Parental Rights: Solving a
Problem or Sowing the Seeds of a New Predicament? 28 Cap U. L. Rev. 97, 100 (1999).
2. O'Flynn, supra n. 1, at 246; Martin Guggenheim, The Foster Care Dilemma and
What to Do About It: Is the Problem That Too Many Children Are Not Being Adopted Out
of Foster Care or That Too Many Children Are Entering Foster Care? 2 U. Pa. J. Const. L.
141, 144 (1999); Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, Expediting the Adoption Process at the
Appellate Level, 28 Cap. U. L. Rev. 121, 122 (1999); H.R. Rep. No. 105-77, at IA (1997).
3. The number of children in foster care and the number of parental-rights termination
proceedings filed in recent years are not negligible. In FY2002 there were 532,000 children
in foster care, and parental rights to 79,000 children were terminated. Admin. for Children
& Fams., U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., National Adoption and Foster Care
Statistics (available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/dis/afcars/publications/afcars
.htm) (accessed Apr. 13, 2004; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and
Process).
The states were quick to comply with the ASFA: By 1999 all states had enacted
legislation that met or exceeded the requirements of ASFA. Employment & Soc. Servs.
Policy Studies Div., Ctr. for Best Practices, Natl. Gov. Assn., A Place to Call Home: State
Efforts to Increase Adoptions and Improve Foster Care Placements 2 (Oct. 26, 2000)
(available at http://www.nga.org/cda/files/001026ADOPTIONS.pdf) (accessed Apr. 13,
2004; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
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ineffective, and I summarize some states' experience with the
application of the Strickland4 standard to ineffectiveness claims
in parental-termination cases. I also describe another
ineffectiveness standard, the fundamental-fairness approach,
which has been adopted by a few state courts, and I attempt to
discern the practical differences between these two standards by
examining the facts and outcomes of specific cases. Finally, I
suggest a framework that might help appellate courts determine
which standard of assessing the performance of lawyers in
parental-rights cases is appropriate.
II. THE TYPICAL PROCEEDING FOR TERMINATION OF PARENTAL
RIGHTS
Although the specific procedures for terminating parental
rights vary widely from state to state, their basic processes are
similar.5 This is partly because the states conform to federal
requirements in order to receive federal money for foster care,6
and partly because the federal government has issued guidelines
for use in parental-termination proceedings.7
4. Stricklandv. Wash., 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
5. See Kathleen A. Bailie, The Other "Neglected" Parties in Child Protective
Proceedings: Parents in Poverty and the Role of the Lawyers Who Represent Them, 66
Fordham L. Rev. 2285, 2298-01 (1998) (describing typical steps in New York child-
protection matters); Denise M. Faehnrich, The "Harm" in the Application of the
"Harmless Error'" Doctrine to the Constitutional Defect in In re C.V., 44 S.D. L. Rev. 340,
362-66 (1999) (describing South Dakota termination proceedings); Jean M. Johnson &
Christa N. Flowers, You Can Never Go Home Again: The Florida Legislature Adds
Incarceration to the List of Statutory Grounds for Termination of Parental Rights, 25 Fla.
St. U. L. Rev. 335, 336-38 (1998) (describing Florida termination procedures); see also
Natl. Council for Juvenile & Fain. Ct. J., Adoption & Permanency Guidelines 29-34
(Termination of Parental Rights Hearings) (available at http://www.pppncjfcj.org/htmlU
adoptguid.html) (accessed Apr. 13, 2004; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice
and Process) [hereinafter Adoption Guidelines].
6. Federal funds are available to the states matching between fifty and eighty percent
of the state's expenditures for foster care, depending upon the state's per capita income.
Admin. for Children & Families, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., Fact Sheet 1-2
(September 22, 2000) (available at http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/opa/facts/chilwelf
.htm) (accessed Apr. 13, 2004; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and
Process).
7. Admin. for Children & Fams., U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., Adoption
2002: The President's Initiative on Adoption and Foster Care, Guidelines for Public Policy
and State Legislation Governing Permanence for Children (1999) (available at http://www.
acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/publications/adopt02/02final.htm) (accessed Apr. 23, 2004; copy
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Generally speaking, when a state or local child-welfare
agency receives a report of child abuse or neglect, it conducts an
investigation. If it determines that the child is in jeopardy and
that a custody order is necessary to protect the child, the agency
files the necessary documents with the court. The child's parents
are entitled to a hearing before the child is removed. These
hearings are variously referred to as dependency proceedings,
jeopardy proceedings, or child-protection proceedings, and
counsel is usually appointed for indigent parents involved in
them.
When custody of the child is given to the state, the court
often orders the state to provide certain services for the parents
or orders the parents to obtain the services. Such services may
include psychological counseling, substance-abuse treatment,
parenting classes, homemaker assistance, and other services to
remedy the problem that led to the child's removal from the
home. The purpose of such services is to facilitate the
reunification of the family. However, in certain situations, the
court may relieve the state from making reasonable efforts to
reunify a family.8 Once a child has been placed in foster care,
the court holds periodic reviews with the parties.
By federal mandate, before a child has been in foster care
for twelve months, a permanency hearing must be held to
determine whether the child will be returned to the parents or the
state will proceed with terminating parental rights.9
Additionally, the state is required to commence proceedings to
terminate parental rights when a child has been in foster care
under the supervision of the state for fifteen of the most recent
twenty-two months.' 0
on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process) [hereinafter Guidelines for Public
Policy].
8. In order to obtain federal funds, states are required to make reasonable efforts to
reunify families. 42 U.S.C. § 67 1(a)(15) (available at http://uscode.house.gov). The states,
however, do not have to make reunification efforts when the parent has subjected the child
to "aggravated circumstances" which include abandonment, murder, or manslaughter of
another child, aggravated assault upon another child, or the involuntary termination of the
parent's rights in another child. Id.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) (available at http://uscode.house.gov).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) (available at http://uscode.house.gov). There are exceptions
to this requirement, such as situations in which the state agency has documented that there
is a compelling reason that termination would not be in the best interest of the child. Id.
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Counsel is usually appointed for the parents, and a guardian
ad litem is named for the child. The burden is on the state to
prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination is
warranted."l The Supreme Court has noted that the New York
termination proceeding resembles a criminal trial in that the
state and parents are both represented by counsel and the rules
of evidence apply.12 Unlike criminal trials, however, termination
hearings are bench trials in most states.1 3 The substantive
grounds for termination vary from state to state but typically
include the abandonment, murder, or aggravated assault of a
child's sibling; severe parental incapacity; and the inability or
unwillingness of a parent to change the circumstances that
caused the child's abuse or neglect. Other grounds suggested
by the federal guidelines include failure of parents to improve;
extreme parental indifference; extreme or repeated abuse or
neglect; and extended imprisonment. 15
A judgment terminating parental rights has the effect of
legally severing the parent-child relationship. The judgment is
appealable, and, in most states, appellate counsel is appointed
for indigent parents. 16
11. In Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982), the Supreme Court held that the
Due Process Clause requires the clear and convincing standard of proof for termination of
parental rights. However, for cases within the purview of the Indian Child Welfare Act,
proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (available at http://
uscode.house.gov). New Hampshire requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt in parental-
termination cases pursuant to the state constitution. In re Shannon M, 766 A.2d 729, 733
(N.H. 2001) (quoting In re Sheena B., 651 A.2d 7 (N.H. 1994)).
12. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 762.
13. Oklahoma and Texas allow jury trials in parental-rights termination proceedings.
See In re A.E., 743 P.2d 1041, 1048 (Okla. 1987); In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 259 (Tex.
2002). Wisconsin, by statute, permits a jury trial for the determination of "whether any
grounds for the termination of parental rights have been proven." Wis. Stat. Ann.
§48.424(3) (1996).
14. See Adoption Guidelines, supra n. 5, at 32.
15. See Guidelines for Public Policy, supra n. 7.
16. See e.g. Vernon S. v. Jerome C. (In re Bryce C.), 906 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Cal. 1995);
In re TMC., 988 P.2d 241, 243-44 (Kan. App. 1999); State ex rel. Children, Youth &
Fams. Dept. v. Alicia P. (In re Jeramy P.), 986 P.2d 460, 462 (N.M. App. 1999); In re T. V,
8 S.W.3d 448, 449 (Tex. App. 10th Dist. 1999); L.C. v. State, 963 P.2d 761, 763-64 (Utah
App. 1998); Grove v. State (In re Tammy Grove), 897 P.2d 1252, 1259 (Wash. 1995).
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III. ARE PARENTS BEING DEPRIVED OF EFFECTIVE COUNSEL IN
TERMINATION CASES?
Almost every state provides counsel to indigent parents
either through public defender offices, a system of appointed
counsel, or contracts with groups of attorneys. Lack of funding
for public defenders and assigned counsel is a chronic
problem. 17 Like defendants in criminal cases, parents who are
accused of neglecting or abusing their children are seldom
sympathetic figures, and they often have no political power.
There is little desire by taxpayers to provide more money for
their lawyers.
States have largely modeled their systems for
representation of indigent parents on systems for representation
of criminal defendants.' This generally means that the
inadequacies of the criminal defense system are transferred to
the representation of parents in termination proceedings. Those
inadequacies include underfunding, which translates to low pay
for attorneys;19  caseloads larger than an attorney can
conscientiously handle; 20 few resources for investigation of
cases and little support staff;21 and sparse, if any, continuing
education or training in the specific aspects of the law of
parental-rights termination.22 California, by court rule, requires
the trial courts to have standards of experience and education
that attorneys must meet in order to be eligible for court
appointment in child-dependency proceedings, but California
appears to be an exception. 23 Indeed, there is minimal incentive
17. See e.g. Richard Klein, The Constitutionalization of Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel, 58 Md. L. Rev. 1433 (1999); Margaret H. Lemos, Student Author, Civil
Challenges to the Use of Low-Bid Contracts for Indigent Defense, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1808
(2000); Robert R. Rigg, The Constitution, Compensation, and Competence: A Case Study,
27 Am. J. Crim. L. 1 (1999); Student Author, Gideon's Promise Unfilled: The Need for
Litigated Reform ofIndigent Defense, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 2062 (2000).
18. Bailie, supra n. 5, at 2305.
19. Id. at 2308-09.
20. Rigg, supra n. 17, at 30-41.
21. Id.
22. Bailie, supra n. 5, at 2324-38 (arguing for a state-certification procedure for court-
appointed attorneys in dependency and termination proceedings that would require
education and training).
23. Cal. R. of Ct., R. 1438(c)(3). This rule requires attorneys to have a minimum of
eight hours of education in dependency law or to have demonstrated sufficient experience
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for appointed or contract lawyers to participate in continuing
legal education in parental-termination law because they will not
be paid enough in such cases to make it worthwhile.
Not only is there little monetary incentive for attorneys to
accept parental-termination cases in an assigned counsel system,
there are usually several factors that provide a disincentive. The
cases are sometimes factually difficult and they are often time-
consuming. The parents may distrust any authority figure,
including their own attorney. The parents, who are usually
undereducated, are often unable to assist with preparation of the
case. Many parents have little insight into the problems that
caused the removal of their children from their homes.
Communication with the parents is sometimes difficult because
they have no phone or consistent location at which to receive
mail, or because they are in and out of jail, treatment centers, or
mental institutions. There may be language or other cultural
barriers. Attorneys handling termination cases often feel more
like social workers than lawyers. Additionally, the cases can be
emotionally draining.
Given the lack of funding, the disincentives for accepting
termination cases, and the lack of requirements for appointment,
it is not surprising that many attorneys who represent parents are
inexperienced. Those few experienced attorneys who are willing
to suffer the long hours and minimal pay out of a sense of moral
or ethical obligation or simply a willingness to serve, often find
their cup overflowing, with judges or other court personnel
pressuring them to take still more cases.
In those jurisdictions where the public defender represents
parents in termination proceedings, excessive caseload is the
major problem.24 Too many cases lead to minimal preparation
for trial. Either because of inexperience or excessive caseload
in dependency proceedings. Every three years the attorneys are to complete eight hours of
education in dependency proceedings. See Santa Clara County Dept. of Fam. & Children 's
Servs. v. Kimberly I. (In re Kristin H.), 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 722, 738 (1996) (referring to aims
and requirements of Rule 1438).
24. For a discussion of funding problems and excessive caseloads of indigent criminal
defense programs, see Harold H. Chen, Malpractice Immunity: An Illegitimate and
Ineffective Response to the Indigent-Defense Crisis, 45 Duke L.J. 783, 788-91 (1996);
Richard Klein, Legal Malpractice, Professional Discipline, and Representation of the
Indigent Defendant, 61 Temp. L. Rev. 1171, 1172-74 (1988); Rigg, supra n. 17, at 24-41.
See also State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 784 (La. 1993) (reciting excessive caseload
numbers of public defender).
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the attorney in a termination case may fail to obtain and review
discovery materials; not know what reports, files or other
materials are available from the state agency; fail to interview or
call witnesses to testify for the parents; fail to develop a defense
theory; or fall into one of many of the potential pitfalls awaiting
the unprepared or inexperienced lawyer.
Therefore, it is not surprising that ineffective assistance of
counsel has been raised as a claim in a number of reported
appeals of parental-rights termination orders. Ineffective
assistance of counsel has now become the most common ground
alleged in proceedings to review criminal convictions, 25 and it is
likely that many attorneys who accept court appointments to
appeal parental-termination orders also handle appellate or post-
conviction criminal cases or, particularly in the case of public
defenders, practice law with attorneys who routinely handle
criminal matters. Thus, lawyers who prosecute parental-
termination appeals are aware, and becoming more aware all the
time, of the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. I did not
find any empirical studies of the number of parental-termination
cases in which a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel has
been made, but a few minutes research using a computer-
assisted research service turns up a large number of cases. 6 The
ineffectiveness issue was raised in a parental-termination
proceeding as early as 1969,27 but most of the reported cases are
from the past decade. The ineffectiveness claim in termination
cases is a substantial one that requires an examination of the
procedural and substantive law in order to develop the most
effective responses and solutions.
25. John M. Burkoff & Nancy M. Burkoff, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel § 1:2(5),
at p. 1-4 (West Group 2002).
26. For example, in December, 2004, a search on LEXIS using the terms "(parent! /2
rights /3 terminat!) and ((effective or ineffective) /2 (assistance /2 counsel)) in the database
of "highest court, all states" yields 148 cases. When that search is expanded to include
intermediate appellate courts by adding the terms "and court (supreme or appe!)" and run
in the "state court cases, combined" database, it yields 1211 cases. Although not every case
produced by this search includes a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, most do.
27. In re Orcutt, 173 N.W.2d 66 (Iowa 1969).
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IV. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN
PARENTAL-TERMINATION CASES
The right to counsel in criminal cases is the springboard for
the right to counsel in parental-termination cases. It is now well-
established that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a right to
counsel to any criminal defendant whose conviction will result
28in a jail sentence. The right applies only to criminal
proceedings,29  however, and the Supreme Court has not
extended it to civil cases.30
Indeed, the Supreme Court held in Lassiter v. Department
of Social Services31 that the federal constitution does not require
the states to appoint counsel for parents in every termination
proceeding. In this five-to-four decision, Justice Stewart, writing
for the majority, noted that in previous cases the right to counsel
was found "only where the litigant may lose his physical liberty
if he loses the litigation," 32 and concluded that there is a
presumption that the right to appointed counsel attaches only
when a person may be deprived of physical liberty.33 The Court
then utilized the three factors enunciated in Mathews v.
Eldridge34 to analyze whether due process requires appointed
counsel when the loss of parental rights is at stake. The Court
weighed the factors against the presumption that there is no right
28. Scott v. Ill., 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
29. U.S. Const. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the
right to... have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.").
30. There is, for example, no Sixth Amendment right to counsel in state post-
conviction proceedings, Pa. v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987), and discretionary appeals of
criminal convictions, Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974). However, the Fourteenth
Amendment requires appointment of counsel to an indigent defendant for a first appeal as
of right. Douglas v. Cal., 372 U.S. 353 (1963). The Due Process Clause requires the
appointment of counsel in parole- and probation-revocation proceedings, but only in
certain cases, and the decision is to be made on a case-by-case basis. Gagnon v. Scarpelli,
411 U.S. 778 (1973). The fundamental-faimess concept of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is the source of the right to counsel and other procedural
protections in juvenile matters. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
31. 452 U.S. 18(1981).
32. Id. at 25.
33. Id. at 26-27.
34. 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (holding that the Due Process Clause does not require an
evidentiary hearing prior to the termination of Social Security disability benefits). The
three factors are (1) the private interests at stake; (2) the risk of an erroneous decision; and
(3) the government's interest. Id. at 335.
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to appointed counsel in the absence of a potential deprivation of
physical liberty.
35
With regard to the first Mathews v. Eldridge factor, the
private interest at stake, the Court reiterated that a parent's
interest in her child is "an extremely important one" 36 and the
parent's interest in the accuracy of a decision to terminate
parental rights is "commanding." 37 Concerning the next factor,
the interest of the government, the Court stated that the
government has a significant interest in the welfare of the
child.38 Although the state has a financial interest in limiting the
expenses of termination proceedings, that interest, while
legitimate, is minimal.39
As to the remaining Mathews v. Eldridge factor-the risk
of an erroneous decision-the Court described the North
Carolina procedures for parental-termination cases. The Court
noted the state's contention that the points of law in Ms.
Lassiter's case were not difficult because "the evidentiary
problems peculiar to criminal trials are not present" and "the
standards for termination are not complicated."40 Nonetheless,
the Court conceded (1) that the issues in a termination hearing
could involve medical and psychiatric evidence; (2) that parents
often have little education; and (3) that the entire process is
"distressing and disorienting" for parents.41  The Court
recognized that for this reason state courts generally require that
42counsel be appointed.
The Court concluded that it would adopt the standard
articulated for parole- and probation-revocation hearings in
Gagnon,43 and
leave the decision whether due process calls for the
appointment of counsel for indigent parents in termination
35. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 27.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 28.
40. Id. at 29. A year later, in Santosky, 455 U.S. at 762, the Court noted that the
standards for terminating parental rights are imprecise and particularly open to influence by
the subjective values ofjudges.
41. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 30.
42. Id.
43. 411 U.S. at 778, 788.
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proceedings to be answered in the first instance by the trial
court, subject, of course, to appellate review.44
The reason for this case-by-case holding is that the Mathews v.
Eldridge factors are not always distributed in the same manner
and due process is not so rigid as to require that "informality,
flexibility and economy... be sacrificed. 4
5
Although the majority in Lassiter adopted Gagnon's case-
by-case approach, it did not reexamine the reasons given in
Gagnon for that approach. Had the court done so, it would have
discovered that the probation-revocation hearings described in
Gagnon bear little resemblance to parental-rights termination
proceedings. In Gagnon, the Court characterized the probation-
revocation hearings as informal hearings conducted without the
rules of evidence .46 Parental-rights-termination hearings,
however, are formal court proceedings, and in many states the
rules of evidence are generally applicable, 47 although there may
be exceptions to the application of particular evidentiary rules.
In many probation revocation matters, according to the Court in
Gagnon, the probationer has admitted the charges, which means
that there is no or little factual dispute. 49 In contrast, there were
factual disputes in Ms. Lassiter's case, as there are in many
termination proceedings. 50
In Gagnon, the Court was concerned that appointment of
counsel would change the very nature of the revocation
proceeding: If the probationer was represented by counsel, the
44. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31-32.
45. Id. at 31 (quoting Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 788).
46. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786-87.
47. See e.g. Iowa Code § 232.96(3) (2000) (providing that rules of evidence apply in
child-in-need-of-assistance proceedings); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22. § 4007(1) (West
1992) (providing that rules of evidence apply in all child-protection proceedings in Maine,
including those that involve the termination of parental rights); W. Va. Code § 49-6-2(c)
(1996) (providing that rules of evidence apply in child neglect or abuse proceedings).
Santosky, 455 U.S. at 762 (stating that formal rules of evidence apply in New York
parental-termination proceedings); In re Shannon M, 766 A.2d at 733 (assuming that rules
of evidence apply to parental terminal proceedings). But see State v. Andrew M, 622
N.W.2d 697, 702 (Neb. App. 2001) (stating that the rules of evidence do not apply in
termination hearings, but only provide a "guidepost").
48. See e.g. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 4007(2) (West 1992) (making hearsay
statements of children admissible in Maine child-protection and parental-termination
proceedings).
49. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 787.
50. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 22-24.
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government would also have to be represented by a lawyer,
5 1
which would cause the government to incur the added financial
cost of providing both an attorney for the probationer and an
attorney for the state. 52 In parental-termination proceedings
however, the state agency is generally represented by a lawyer,
51
and the proceeding is an adversarial one, whether the parent is
represented or not. In Gagnon, the Court suggested that the
revocation-hearing body would become more like a judge if the
probationer and the government were represented by attorneys.
54
This concern seems irrelevant in the termination context,
because parental-termination proceedings are presided over by
judges.
In Lassiter, Justice Blackmun, joined by three dissenters,
stated that the Mathews v. Eldridge analysis should not be
limited to the facts of the case at hand, and should not be applied
on a case-by-case basis.55 He recalled Betts v. Brady,56 in which
the Court had said that right to counsel in criminal cases also
depended upon a case-by-case analysis, and he pointed out that
Betts was eventually overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright,
57
primarily for the reason that trials can be presumed fair only if
counsel is available.
58
Although Justice Blackmun took issue with the Court's
presumption that there is no right to counsel unless incarceration
is at stake, his dissent is primarily focused on the "illo cal"
conclusion that there must be a case-by-case analysis. He
51. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 787.
52. Id. at 788.
53. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 762 (stating that the state is represented by counsel in
New York termination proceedings); but see Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 29 (noting that the North
Carolina Departments of Social Services reported that social workers sometimes
represented them at termination hearings when the parents were not represented by
counsel).
54. 411 U.S. at 788.
55. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 48-52 (Blackmun, Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
Another of the dissenters, Justice Stevens, wrote separately to express his opinion that the
Mathews v. Eldridge analysis works better for property interests than liberty interests, and
that the "natural relationship" between parents and children is a liberty interest. Id. at 59-60
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
56. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
57. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
58. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 36.
59. Id. at 49 (Blackmun, J. dissenting). Justice Blackmun also weighed the three
Eldridge factors differently from the majority. Because of the significant interest in the
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argued that a case-by-case approach is unworkable because an
appellate court is not able to discern from the record what a
lawyer with imagination, who undertook investigation and legal
research, would have been able to do with a case in which the
parents did not have counsel. 60 Justice Blackmun also pointed
out that the case-by-case analysis of Betts v. Brady had caused
numerous post-conviction challenges.
6
'
Even so, the Lassiter approach, while not as efficient as a
rule that applies to every case, ought at least to mean that in
almost every contested case, counsel will be appointed. The
circumstances that should favor appointment of counsel62 are, in
fact, present in most parental-termination cases: The state
usually presents at least one expert witness; the parents are often
undereducated and inarticulate; and the court must typically
resolve difficult factual issues.
63
Lassiter was decided over twenty years ago, and its holding
has not been questioned by the Supreme Court. That may be
because most states have now moved beyond Lassiter, and
require appointment of counsel either by state constitution,
statute, rule, or case law. Nonetheless, Lassiter is still
family, he found that the first factor weighed heavily in support of appointed counsel. He
found that the state's interest in not appointing counsel was limited. With regard to the risk
of an erroneous determination, he concluded that the risk was substantial. The procedure
utilized for termination proceedings resembles a criminal prosecution; the state marshals
considerable expertise and assets in prosecuting the case; and the legal issues are not
simple or well-defined. Id. at 44-45 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
60. Id. at 51.
61. Id. at 51-52. The Alaska Supreme Court, in deciding that the Alaska Constitution
requires appointment of counsel for indigent parents in termination proceedings, expressly
rejected Lassiter's case-by-case analysis for the same reasons. In re K.L.J., 813 P.2d 276,
282 n. 6 (Alaska 1991). The Alaska court discussed the burdens that the case-by-case
approach imposes on the trial court, including the need to develop pretrial procedures to
determine in advance whether counsel should be appointed. It noted the difficulty of
foretelling accurately whether certain facts were going to be contested or what the nature of
the cross-examination would be. It predicted that the pretrial determination of whether
counsel should be appointed was likely to delay the proceedings and add time and issues to
the appellate process. Id.
62. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 30.
63. As a trial judge, I preferred having all parties represented by counsel because the
cases proceeded more smoothly and were likely to contain less error, and the presence of
counsel made general fact-finding easier. When all parties are represented by counsel, the
judge does not have to step outside of the judicial role. As an appellate judge, I can attest to
the fact that in many cases pro se appellants are simply unable to articulate what it is they
are appealing except to say that the trial judge was wrong.
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considered to be a setback by those advocating for the rights of
parents. Because the Supreme Court has not declared that the
Due Process Clause requires the appointment of counsel in
every parental-termination case, the rights of indigent parents
remain at risk. States may at any time repeal their statutory
authority for counsel or withdraw funding for court-appointed
counsel.
Parental-rights cases decided by the Supreme Court after
Lassiter include ML.B. v. S.L.J.,64 in which the Court held that
an indigent parent whose parental rights were terminated is
entitled to a transcript of the proceedings at the state's expense
in order to prosecute an appeal. Justice Ginsburg, joined by four
other justices, was careful to distinguish Lassiter, writing that a
the right to counsel was "less encompassing" than the right of
access to the courts.6 5  The majority performed an equal
protection analysis, weighing a mother's fundamental right to a
relationship with her children against the state's economic
justification for the rules that forced her to pay for a transcript. It
concluded that Mississippi's refusal to allow M.L.B.'s appeal
deprived her of equal access to the courts.66
Another significant post-Lassiter decision is Troxel v.
Granville,67 in which the Court found unconstitutional a
Washington statute that allowed non-parents to seek a court
order of visitation. The "sweeping breadth" 68 of the statute was
an unconstitutional infringement on the fundamental right of the
parents to make decisions concerning the care and custody of
their children. 69 In reaching its conclusion, the Court examined
its prior cases regarding the rights of parents and concluded that
"extensive precedent" indicated that
it cannot now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right
64. 519 U.S. 102 (1996).
65. Id. at 113.
66. Id. at 120-28. Justice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion, concluded that the Due
Process Clause was a sufficient basis for the Court's holding. Id. at 129 (Kennedy, J.
concurring).
67. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
68. Id. at 73.
69. Id.
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of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody,
and control of their children.
70
V. THE STATUS OF PARENTS' RIGHT TO COUNSEL, AND THEIR
RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE COUNSEL, IN THE STATE COURTS
A. The Right to Counsel after Lassiter
According to Lassiter, thirty-three states and the District of
Columbia provided counsel to parents in termination cases by
1981.71 Twelve of the states that did not then routinely appoint
counsel now do so, although in some states the ajpointment may
depend upon the parent's request for counsel.7 It appears that
five of these states do not have a state constitutional provision,
statute, or rule requiring appointment of counsel and therefore
make a case-by-case determination of whether counsel should be
appointed.7 3
Although Lassiter requires trial courts in states that do not
appoint counsel in every case to perform a Mathews v. Eldridge
analysis, at least one commentator suggests that these Lassiter
hearings seldom take place.74 The denial of counsel is subject to
appellate review, according to Lassiter,75 and an appellate court
is obligated to review the record and perform a Mathews v.
Eldridge analysis when the lack of counsel is raised on appeal.
The Tennessee Court of Appeals has done so in several
cases, and it has reminded the trial courts of their duty to
70. Id. at 66.
71. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 34.
72. Rosalie R. Young, The Right to Appointed Counsel in Termination of Parental
Rights Proceedings: The States' Response to Lassiter, 14 Touro L. Rev. 247, 260-62
(including discussion of provisions), 275 (containing table) (1997).
73. In 1997 Young identified six states state without a constitutional provision, statute,
or rule requiring appointment of counsel. Id. at 260, 275, 276. Those states were Delaware,
Hawaii, Mississippi, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Wyoming. In 2002, however,
Delaware enacted rules requiring appointment of counsel. See Hughes v. Div. of Fam.
Servs., 836 A.2d 498, 509 (Del. 2003) (citing Del. Fam. Ct. R. 206, 207), cert. denied,
2004 U.S. LEXIS 1973 (March 8, 2004).
74. William Wesley Patton, Standard of Appellate Review for Denial of Counsel and
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Child Protection and Parental Severance Cases, 27
Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 195, 202 (1996).
75. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 32.
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determine whether a parent is entitled to appointed counsel.76 In
applying the Mathews v. Eldridge factors, it has found that the
competing interests of the parents and the state are evenly
balanced. For that reason, the factor regarding the risk of an
erroneous decision is the primary consideration. 77 Furthermore,
the Tennessee court, borrowing from Lassiter and Davis v.
Page,78 has detailed a number of factors that it considers in
determining the risk of an erroneous decision.79
In contrast, the Mississippi Supreme Court did not perform
a Mathews v. Eldridge analysis in an appeal in which the mother
claimed that her due process rights were violated because she
had no attorney. 0 Mississippi has no statute or case law
requiring appointment of counsel. 81 The court affirmed the
termination of the mother's parental rights, and held that she
was not denied due process even though the attorney who had
been representing her on a pro bono basis withdrew three days
before the termination trial. The court concluded that because
the mother had not requested a continuance in order to obtain a
lawyer and because the evidence against her was overwhelming,
she was not denied due process.82
76. In re Adoption of J.D. W., 2000 WL 1156628 *6 (Tenn. App. Aug. 16, 2000) (citing
several cases in which court performed Lassiter review).
77. State ex rel. T.H v. Min, 802 S.W.2d 625, 626-27 (Tenn. App. 1990).
78. 640 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc), vacated sub nom. Chastain v. Davis, 458
U.S. 1118 (1982), on remand, 714 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1984). Davis, decided three months
before Lassiter, held that appointment of counsel was constitutionally required in child-
dependency proceedings. The court expressly rejected the case-by-case method. It found
that "the complexity of these proceedings always necessitates the offer of counsel." Id. at
604.
79. Those factors are: (1) expert medical or psychiatric testimony at the hearing; (2) the
difficulty of the parents in dealing with life; (3) the level of distrust and disorientation
thrust upon the parents at the hearing; (4) the difficulty and complexity of the issues; (5)
the possibility of self-incrimination; (6) the education of the parents; and (7) the
permanency of the arrangement proposed by the state. The last factor is relevant only in
dependency proceedings. Min, 802 S.W.2d at 627.
80. K.D.G.L.B.P. v. Hinds County Dept. of Human Servs., 771 So. 2d 907 (Miss. 2000).
81. Id. at 911, 14.
82. Id. The record showed that the children had first been removed from the mother's
home in 1995; she was homeless for eighteen months while her children were in foster
care; a petition for termination of parental rights was filed in 1996; in 1997 and 1998,
custody of the two children was returned to her. In a few months she and her new husband
moved to Florida with the children. She notified the Mississippi officials, who agreed that
she could stay in Florida pending a home study. Shortly thereafter, the Florida officials
removed the children when the mother was arrested for stabbing her husband with a paring
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Rhode Island, which has a court rule requiring appointment
of counsel, has held that while the rule requires appointment of
counsel, it does not require the appointment of substitute counsel
if the parent discharges the appointed counsel. In In re Bryce
T.,83 the mother appealed the termination order on the ground
that she had been denied due process because the trial court
refused to appoint substitute counsel after her attorney was
allowed to withdraw and she had to represent herself.8  The
court stated that it was
doubtful that counsel would have affected the outcome
here, given [the mother's] chronic substance abuse
problem, her failure to successfully complete treatment
and the termination of her parental rights to another child.85
The court did not explicitly perform a Mathews v. Eldridge
analysis, and it apparently assumed that the rights of the mother
and the interests of the state were in equipoise, and that the risk
of an erroneous determination was minimal because of the
mother's history.
B. The Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel
In the criminal context the practical enforcement of the
right to effective counsel is dependent upon whether the right to
counsel is constitutionally based. In criminal prosecutions in
knife, and the children were returned to Mississippi. Id. at 911-13. The court stated that the
record demonstrated that the mother had suffered from deep psychological problems for a
number of years; that she was unable to admit that she had been responsible for the
removal of the children from her home; and that she refused to accept responsibility for
being homeless for eighteen months. Id. at 911.
83. 764 A.2d 718 (R.I. 2001).
84. On the day of the termination hearing, the mother's attorney, who was from the
legal-services agency, asked to withdraw because the mother wanted to discharge her.
After a lengthy discussion between the mother and the trial judge during which he tried to
dissuade her from discharging her attorney and explained that the attorney was well-
qualified, the court allowed the attorney to withdraw. The court postponed the hearing to
allow the mother to obtain another attorney. It denied her request for an appointed attorney
on the basis of a memorandum from the chief judge stating that private counsel could be
appointed only if the legal services agency or the public defender was unavailable. Id. at
720. The appellate court stated: "[W]e believe that any duty to appoint counsel in a
termination of parental rights case is discharged if counsel from Legal Services is
appointed, provided that the record indicates that the appointed counsel effectively
represented the parent." Id. at 722.
85. Id.
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which a defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel, that
86right extends to the effective representation by counsel. The
Supreme Court has declared, however, that unless there is a
federal constitutional right to counsel, there is no federal
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel even in
those R roceedings in which counsel has been appointed by the
court.
In the parental-rights context, then, presumably there is a
federal constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in
every case in which a Lassiter analysis finds a right to counsel.88
A few states have concluded that there is a state constitutional
right to counsel in parental-termination proceedings, and
consequently, a constitutional right to effective counsel. 9 Other
states have determined or stated in dicta that there is a state
constitutional right to counsel in cases in which the issue of
effective counsel was not raised.90
86. U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
87. Because there is no constitutional right to counsel for a discretionary appeal, Ross
v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974), there is no right to effective assistance of counsel to
prosecute a discretionary appeal, Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586 (1982). Likewise,
because states are not required by the federal constitution to appoint counsel for post-
conviction matters, there is no constitutional requirement that counsel be effective. Pa. v.
Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987).
88. An example of a case in which the court conducted a Lassiter analysis to determine
whether the father in a dependency proceeding had a constitutional right to counsel which,
in turn, determined whether he had a right to effective counsel, is San Bernadino County
Dept. of Pub. Soc. Servs. v. Ebrahim A. (In re Emilye A.), 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 294, 302-4 (Cal.
App. 1992). The court noted that the father had a statutory right to counsel. Id. at 300. See
also In re Doe, 2003 Haw. App. LEXIS 192, at *14 (June 20, 2003) (assuming that
appointed counsel must be effective).
89. See V.F. v. State, 666 P.2d 42, 45 (Alaska 1983) (holding that due process clause of
Alaska Constitution gives parents right to effective assistance of counsel); Dept. of Soc.
Servs. v. Trowbridge (In re Trowbridge), 401 N.W.2d 65, 66 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987)
(holding that right to counsel is found in equal protection clauses of federal and Michigan
Constitutions as well as in statute); Michael F. v. State ex rel. Dept. of Human Servs. (In re
D.D.F.), 801 P.2d 703, 706-07 (Okla. 1990) (recognizing previous holding that Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees right to counsel, and holding that after Lassiter, Oklahoma
Constitution requires appointed counsel in all termination cases); Dept. of Soc. & Health
Servs. v. Moseley (In re Moseley), 660 P.2d 315, 318 (Wash. App. 1983) (holding that
Washington Constitution requires effective assistance of counsel).
90. See e.g. In re D.B., 385 So. 2d 83, 90 (Fla. 1980) (holding that the right to counsel
stems from the Due Process Clauses of both the federal and state constitutions); L.W. v.
Dept. of Children & Fams., 812 So. 2d 551, 554 (Fla. 1st Dist. App. 2002) (recognizing
both state constitutional and statutory right to counsel) O.A.H. v. R.L.A., 712 So. 2d 4, 7
(Fla. 2d Dist. App. 1998) (noting that Florida Supreme Court continues to confirm a state
constitutional right to appointed counsel in parental-termination proceedings); In re A.S.A.,
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Many states have decided that because there is a state
statutory provision for the appointment of counsel, that statutory
right is meaningless unless it is the effective assistance of
counsel to which the parent is entitled. 91 These courts use
language such as, "[a] right to counsel is of little value unless
there is an expectation that counsel's assistance will be
effective," 92 and "[i]t is axiomatic that the right to counsel
includes the right to competent counsel., 93 Most of the states
that have grounded an ineffectiveness claim on a statutory right
to counsel have ignored the proposition that there is no right to
effective counsel unless it is a constitutional right.
The Utah Court of Appeals, for example, made a
persuasive statement in support of finding a right to effective
counsel. It said that a right to counsel is meaningless unless the
852 P.2d 127, 129-30 (Mont. 1993) (holding that the Due Process Clause of the Montana
Constitution guarantees appointed counsel to an indigent parent in proceedings to terminate
parental rights); In re Lindsey C., 473 S.E.2d 110, 122 n. 12 (W. Va. 1995) (suggesting that
right to assigned counsel in parental-termination cases comes from West Virginia
Constitution, and indicating that appointment of counsel is required in abuse and neglect
cases). See also D.S. v. T.D.K. (In re Adoption of K.A.S.), 499 N.W.2d 558, 563 (N.D.
1993) (finding that the Equal Protection Clause of the North Dakota Constitution requires
court-appointed counsel in parental-termination proceedings pursuant to the Revised
Uniform Adoption Act because the other statutory means of terminating parental rights
provide for the appointment of counsel for parents).
91. In re E.D. v. State Dept. of Human Resources, 777 So. 2d 113, 115 (Ala. 2000); In
re Appeal in Gila County Juvenile Action No. J-3824, 637 P.2d 740, 743 (Ariz. 1981)
(analyzing guardian ad litem statute); Kristin H., 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 722, 736-38 (Cal. App.
6th Dist. 1996); People in re V.A.E.Y.H.D., 605 P.2d 916, 919 (Colo. 1980); L.W., 812 So.
2d at 554-55 (listing states that have recognized ineffectiveness claim, and extending it to
dependency proceedings); (Nix v. Dept. of Human Resources, 225 S.E.2d 306, 307-08 (Ga.
1976); In re J.P., 737 N.E.2d 364, 370 (Ill. App. 2000) (holding that right to effective
counsel flows from U.S. Constitution and Illinois statutes); In re Rushing, 684 P.2d 445,
448 (Kan. App. 1984); In re Care and Protection of Stephen, 514 N.E.2d 1087, 1090-91
(Mass. 1987); Johnson v. JK.C. (In reJ.C.), 781 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Mo. App. 1989) (listing
states that have recognized viability of ineffective-assistance claim); State ex rel. Human
Servs. Dept. (In re Termination of Parental Rights of James WH), 849 P.2d 1079, 1081
(N.M. App. 1993); In re Erin G., 527 N.Y.S.2d 488, 490 (N.Y. App Div. 1988); In re
Oghenekevebe, 473 S.E.2d 393, 396 (N.C. App. 1996); Jones v. Lucas County Children
Servs. Bd, 546 N.E.2d 471, 473 (Ohio App. 6th Dist. 1988); State ex rel. Juvenile Dept. of
Multnomah County v. Geist (In re Geist), 796 P.2d 1193, 1200 (Ore. 1990); In re MS., 115
S.W.3d 534, 544 (Tex. 2003); State v. A.H. (In re E.H.), 880 P.2d 11, 13 (Utah. App.
1994); A.S. v. State (In re MD.(S.)), 485 N.W.2d 52, 54 (Wis. 1992).
For a discussion of several California Court of Appeal cases that the author terms
"inconsistent," see Patton, supra n. 74, at 230-31.
92. Care and Protection of Stephen, 514 N.E.2d at 1090-91 (Mass. 1987).
93. Trowbridge, 401 N.W.2d at 66.
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right is to effective counsel, and because the court has a duty to
interpret state statutes so that they are meaningful, it would
interpret the statutory provision as one calling for the effective
assistance of counsel. 4 In a similar view, the Texas Supreme
Court stated:
[I]t would seem a useless gesture on the one hand to
recognize the importance of counsel in termination
proceedings, as evidenced by the statutory right to
appointed counsel, and, on the other hand, not require that
counsel perform effectively.
95
The Iowa Supreme Court simply assumes that due process
means that if there is a statutory right to counsel, that right has to
be to effective assistance of counsel.96 In at least two states there
are statutes expressly providing for effective assistance of
counsel or competent counsel,97 but in some jurisdictions there
has been no determination as to whether there is a right to
effective assistance of counsel.98 The Vermont Supreme Court
has denied an ineffectiveness claim on its merits while stating
that it was not deciding whether such a claim could be viable."
The Nebraska Court of Appeals has declined to recognize an
ineffectiveness claim, stating that such claims are available only
in criminal cases.'
00
94. A.H., 880 P.2d at 13. The rationale used by the New Mexico Court of Appeals is
similar. James W.H., 849 P.2d at 1081.
95. MS., 115 S.W.3d at 544 (quoting In re K.L., 91 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Tex. App. Fort
Worth Dist. 2002)).
96. In re D.W., 385 N.W.2d 570, 579 (Iowa 1986) (stating that "due process requires
counsel appointed under a statutory directive to provide effective assistance").
97. See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 317.5(a) (West 1998) ("All parties who are
represented by counsel at dependency proceedings shall be entitled to competent counsel.")
Minnesota's statute provides for effective assistance of counsel in termination
proceedings. Minn. Stat. § 260C.163(3)(a) (West Supp. 2003). The Minnesota Supreme
Court makes a distinction between the constitutional right to counsel and a statutory right
to counsel in determining the appropriate procedure for a trial court to use when attempting
to ensure that a parent's waiver of counsel is knowing and intelligent. In re G.L.H., 614
N.W.2d 718, 722-23 (Minn. 2000).
98. For example, in Maine there is a statutory right to counsel, 22 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 4005(2) (West Supp. 2000), and there is apparently a state constitutional right, Danforth
v. St. Dept. of Health & Welfare, 303 A.2d 794, 800 (Me. 1973), but there is no reported
termination case discussing ineffective assistance of counsel.
99. In re MB., 647 A.2d 1001, 1003 n. 3 (Vt. 1994) (allowing claim of ineffective
assistance to be raised without discussing basis of the claim).
100. In re Azia B., 626 N.W. 2d 602, 612 (Neb. App. 2001).
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In summary, many jurisdictions have finessed the
constitutional/statutory dichotomy and have taken a logical and
common-sense approach. In all but a few states, whether the
right to counsel stems from a state constitutional provision or
from a statute, it appears that parents have a right to effective
assistance of counsel in proceedings to terminate their parental
rights.
VI. THE PROCEDURAL VEHICLE FOR RAISING A CLAIM OF
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE IN PARENTAL-TERMINATION
PROCEEDINGS
The right to effective assistance of counsel is hollow if it
cannot be enforced. Although most jurisdictions recognize the
right to counsel in parental-termination cases and agree that it is
worthy of enforcement, there is no consensus on the proper
procedure for bringing an ineffectiveness claim to the attention
of a court. In the criminal context the primary procedures for
claiming ineffectiveness of counsel are direct appeal and post-
conviction review, but the rules vary. A criminal defendant ma
be required to raise an ineffectiveness claim on direct appeal,'I
allowed in some situations to bring the claim on direct appeal,'10
2
or required to bring the claim in a post-conviction proceeding. 0 3
It is little wonder, then, that the states have various approaches
to ineffectiveness claims in parental-termination proceedings as
well.
While many states have statutory post-conviction
procedures, equivalent statutory procedures for the collateral
101. For a thorough discussion of the types of ineffectiveness claims, and conclusions
about which of them can be presented on direct appeal, see Woods v. State, 701 N.E.2d
1208 (Ind. 1998).
102. See State v. Litherland, 12 P.3d 92 (Utah 2000); see also Wayne R. LaFave, et al.,
Criminal Procedure § 11.7(e) (West Group 1999) (citing cases).
103. See Cmmw. v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726, 735-37 (Pa. 2002) (listing the relevant state
statutes and stating that the "overwhelming majority" of states prefer ineffectiveness claims
to be raised on collateral review); see also Anne M. Voigts, Student Author, Narrowing the
Eye of the Needle: Procedural Default, Habeas Reform, and Claims of Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1103, 1127 n. 141 (1999) (listing cases in which
courts have held that ineffectiveness claims cannot be brought on direct appeal).
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review of parental-termination judgments do not exist. 10 4 The
procedures for bringing an ineffectiveness claim in parental-
termination cases have been developed by decisional law.'
0 5
A. Direct Appeal
The most common vehicle for raising an ineffectiveness
claim in a parental-termination case is the direct appeal of the
termination order. In State ex rel. Juvenile Department of
Multnomah County v. Geist (In re Geist),10 6  the Oregon
Supreme Court held that direct appeal is the best method for
104. At least one state, however, has a statute permitting the reopening of a termination
judgment, see Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-719 (West Supp. 2004).
105. Various court actions are potentially available to a parent who has been deprived of
adequate counsel, but a discussion of their relative merits is beyond the scope of this
article. Parents can, for example, seek monetary damages from the attorney through a
professional malpractice action. Several commentators have explored in detail the
difficulties in malpractice actions brought by criminal defendants against their trial or
appellate counsel, and parents whose rights have been terminated would likely encounter
similar difficulties. See Chen, supra n. 24; Klein, supra n. 24; David A. Sadoff, The Public
Defender as Private Offender: A Retreat from Evolving Malpractice Liability Standards for
Public Defenders, 32 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 883 (1995).
Another type of action to enforce the right to adequate counsel is one for prospective
relief that challenges the system of providing counsel for indigent parents. Claims brought
on behalf of indigent criminal defendants or the lawyers who represent them have met with
varying degrees of success. See State v. Smith, 681 P.2d 1374 (Ariz. 1984) (holding that
contract system in one county violated right to effective counsel because attorney was so
overburdened he could not adequately represent all clients, and concluding that if system
continued in existence, ineffectiveness would be presumed in individual cases); State v.
Peart, 621 So. 2d 780 (La. 1993) (holding that local public defender office was so
overworked that ineffectiveness would be presumed); State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150 (Okla.
1990) (holding that court-appointment system, as applied, violated state constitutional due
process rights of appointed attorneys). But see Kennedy v. Carlson, 544 N.W.2d 1 (Minn.
1996) (finding no justiciable controversy because parties made no showing that public
defender's clients were actually prejudiced). The procedure utilized in these systematic
challenges are direct appeal from a criminal conviction, Smith, 681 P.2d at 1376; pre-trial
motion in the criminal case, Peart, 621 So. 2d at 784; request by attorneys for counsel fees
at conclusion of criminal case, Lynch, 796 P.2d at 1154; and declaratory judgment action
by public defender, Kennedy, 522 N.W.2d at 3. For commentary on systematic challenges,
see Gideon's Promise, supra n. 17, at 2069-78; Lemos, supra n. 17; Marc L. Miller, Wise
Masters, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1751 (1999) (reviewing Malcolm M. Feeley & Edward L. Rubin,
Judicial Policy Making and the Modern State: How the Courts Reformed America 's
Prisons (Cambridge U. Press 1998)).
106. 796 P.2d 1193 (Or. 1990).
INEFFECTIVE-ASSISTANCE CLAIMS IN PARENTAL-RIGHTS CASES 201
reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 10 7 The
court first found that the statutory right to counsel includes a
right to effective counsel, but because the legislature had not
established a procedure to vindicate the right to adequate
counsel, the court determined that it was free to fashion an
appropriate procedure. 10 8 It discussed the need for finality and
the amount of time that passes between the filing of the original
dependency petition and the granting of the parental-termination
order. 10 9 It noted that protracted litigation is not in the interest of
the child, the natural parents, or the prospective adopting
parents:
[A] procedure that allows a terminated parent to make a
claim of inadequate counsel only after all direct statutory
appeals have been exhausted would only further delay the
finality of the termination decisions 10
The court suggested that there may be some situations in which
a factual hearing in the trial court is appropriate, but it declined
to express any views on how the appellate court should handle a
remand or how the trial court should handle a factual hearing.'11
The New Mexico Court of Appeals, relying on the reasons
set forth in Geist, also held that ineffectiveness claims should be
raised on direct appeal. 1 2 The Pennsylvania Superior Court
determined that direct appeal was the appropriate method
because it was expeditious and collateral attacks were not
authorized. 113 The Georgia Court of Appeals has allowed an
ineffectiveness claim to be raised on direct appeal, but remanded
for an evidentiary hearing upon determining that the record was
107. Id. at 1201. This is in contrast to the rule in Oregon that ineffectiveness claims in
criminal matters are "more properly" resolved in post-conviction proceedings so that an
evidentiary record can be made. State v. Neighbors, 640 P.2d 643, 645 (Or. App. 1982).
108. Geist, 796 P.2d at 1200 ("The statutory right to adequate trial counsel may prove
illusory if there is no procedure for review of claims of inadequate counsel").
109. Id at 1201.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1204n. 16.
112. James W.H., 849 P.2d at 1081. In a later case the court held that a remand for an
evidentiary hearing would be appropriate. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Fams. Dept. v.
Tammy S., 974 P. 2d 158, 163 (N.M. App. 1998).
113. In re Adoption of T.MF., 573 A.2d 1035, 1043 (Pa. Super. 1990) (en banc). In
another case reviewing an ineffectiveness claim in a dependency proceeding, the same
court held that such claims must be raised on direct appeal, and set out the standard of
review. In reJ.P., 573 A.2d 1057, 1066 (Pa. Super. 1990) (en banc).
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inadequate. 114 The Missouri Court of Appeals ruled that the
claim has to be raised on direct appeal or it is deemed waived. 115
The Iowa Supreme Court, in a case involving the adequacy of
representation of a child, rather than a parent, ruled that because
there was no procedural equivalent of post-conviction relief for
proceedings to terminate parental rights, the issue had to be
raised by direct appeal." 6 In a case before the Ohio Court of
Appeals, appellate counsel, who also had been trial counsel,
raised ineffectiveness on direct appeal. 17 The court said that if
the case were a criminal case, it would not permit the issue to be
raised on direct appeal because where trial counsel is appellate
counsel, it is presumed that appellate counsel is incapable of
making the argument for ineffectiveness at the trial level.
However, since there was no such thing as post-conviction relief
in a termination case, the court "reluctantly" addressed the
merits of the claim."
8
Many courts have allowed ineffectiveness claims in
termination proceedings to be raised on direct appeal in cases in
which they do not discuss their rationale for this decision. 1 9 In
114. In reA.L.E., 546 S.E.2d 319, 325 (Ga. App. 2001).
115. C.WB. v. LaFata (In re C.N.W.), 26 S.W.3d 386, 393 (Mo. App. 2000).
Nonetheless, because of the importance of the proceeding, the court examined the entire
record and found that the parent's lawyer was not ineffective. Id. By contrast, claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel in criminal cases are not cognizable on direct appeal in
Missouri. State v. Taylor, I S.W.3d 610, 612 (Mo. App. 1999).
116. In re J.P.B., 419 N.W.2d 387, 390 (Iowa 1988). In Iowa, ineffectiveness claims in
criminal cases can be raised on post-conviction review, and if they are not raised on direct
appeal, the applicant must demonstrate cause for not having raised the issue then. Collins v.
State, 477 N.W.2d 374, 376 (Iowa 1991).
117. In re Whiteman, 1993 WL 241729 *15 (Ohio App. 6th Dist. 1993).
118. Id. Ohio requires claims of ineffectiveness in criminal cases, when appellate
counsel is the not the same as trial counsel, to be brought on direct appeal. State v. Cole,
443 N.E.2d 169 (Ohio 1982).
119. VF. v. State, 666 P.2d 42, 45-46 (Alaska 1983); Gila County Juvenile Action, 637
P.2d at 743; People ex rel. V.A.E. Y.H.D, 605 P.2d 916, 919 (Colo. 1980); In re K.ML., 516
S.E.2d 363, 366 (Ga. App. 1999); State Dept. of Health & Welfare v. Mahoney-Williams
(In re MT.P.), 611 P.2d 1065, 1066-67 (Idaho 1980); People v. K.K. (In re KR.K), 631
N.E.2d 449, 454-55 (Ill. App. 2d Dist. 1994); Bickel v. St. Joseph County Dept. of Pub.
Welfare (In re Termination of Parent/Child Relationship of D.T.), 547 N.E.2d 278, 281
(Ind. App. 1989); Rushing, 684 P.2d at 448; Trowbridge, 401 N.W.2d at 66; In re Erin G.,
527 N.Y.S.2d 488, 490 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988); Buncombe County Dept. of Soc. Servs. v.
Burks (In re Bishop), 375 S.E.2d 676, 678-79 (N.C. App. 1989); Jones, 546 N.E.2d at 473;
Michael F. v. State ex rel. Dept. of Human Servs. (In re D.D.F.), 801 P.2d 703, 706 (Okla.
1990); In re MS., 115 S.W.3d 534, 536 (Tex. 2003); E.H., 880 P.2d at 13; Wright v.
Alexandria Div. ofSoc. Servs., 433 S.E.2d 500, 502-03 (Va. App. 1993); MB., 647 A.2d at
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those cases in which it is determined on direct appeal that the
parent was denied effective assistance of counsel, the result has
been a remand to the trial court for a new trial. 120 In at least one
instance an appellate court set a thirty-day time limit in which
the new trial was to take place. 12
1
B. Post-Judgment Motions
Some courts do not allow ineffectiveness claims in
termination cases to be raised on direct appeal. The Minnesota
Court of Appeals, for example, did not permit a parent to raise
an ineffectiveness claim on direct appeal: "An appellant is
precluded from alleging other error on appeal without first
providing the district court an opportunity to correct the error by
filing post-trial motions." 122 The Iowa Court of Appeals has also
stated that ineffectiveness cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal. 23 Other courts, while not stating that direct appeal is
unavailable for ineffectiveness claims, have approved the use of
post-judgment motions. For example, the Alabama Supreme
Court found a motion to set aside a judgment to be an
"appropriate" method for raising an ineffectiveness claim,
characterizing it as the civil equivalent of the criminal
method. 124 The Connecticut Supreme Court held that direct
appeal, although sometimes acceptable, was not appropriate in at
least one case because of an inadequate record, and suggested
several types of post-judgment motions that could be utilized by
a parent to raise an ineffectiveness claim. 125 It noted that a
Connecticut statute allows the reopening of a parental-rights
termination order. 126 It also suggested use of common law
1003; Moseley, 660 P.2d at 317; In re R.J.M, 266 S.E.2d 114, 115 (W. Va. 1980).
120. Gila County Juvenile Action, 637 P.2d at 746; State ex.rel. State Off. for Servs. to
Children & Farns. v. Thomas (In re Stephens), 12 P.3d 537, 538 (Or. App. 2000); State ex
rel. State Off. for Servs. to Children & Fams. v. Rogers (In re Eldridge), 986 P.2d 726, 731
(Or. App. 1999).
121. Sheltering Arms Children's Servs. v. Harriet J. (In re Orneika J.), 491 N.Y.S.2d
639, 641 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dept. 1985).
122. In re JMK.A., No. CO-97-1156, 1997 WL 770399 *3 (Minn. App. Dec. 16, 1997).
123. In re B.P., No. 02-0422, 2002 WL 1842966 *2 (Iowa App. Aug. 14, 2002).
124. In re E.D. v. State Dept. of Human Resources, 777 So.2d 113, 116 (Ala. 2000).
125. In re Jonathan M, 764 A.2d 739, 754-56 (Conn. 2001).
126. Id. at 755; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-719 (West. Supp. 2004).
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principles for reopening judgments obtained by fraud or mutual
mistake, and it indicated that in some situations a parent could
move for a new trial. 127 The Utah Court of Appeals indicated
that Rule 60(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was an
appropriate vehicle for raising an ineffectiveness claim,'28 but
the Missouri Court of Appeals has held that ineffectiveness "is
not one of the specified reasons for setting aside a judgment
under the rule."
At least one Texas appellate court permitted the
ineffectiveness claim to be brought on direct appeal, but stated
that it should be raised in a post-trial motion below in order to
develop the record. 130 In a subsequent Texas Supreme Court
case, the court allowed the claim on direct appeal, but remanded
the case to the intermediate appellate court for an analysis of
whether counsel's errors had caused harm. 1
31
One jurisdiction that applies the established procedure for
raising ineffectiveness in criminal proceedings to termination
cases is Wisconsin.1 32 When an ineffectiveness claim is brought
in a criminal case, the trial court holds a post-judgment Machner
hearing 133 in order to develop the evidentiary record regarding
the performance of trial counsel. In a parental-rights termination
case, the Machner hearing is likewise a prerequisite to a claim of
ineffective representation: "[T]estimony from petitioners' trial
counsel should be elicited to discover the underlying reasons for
the trial counsels' actions and inactions. 134 The Michigan Court
of Appeals limits the claim of ineffectiveness to the appeal
127. Jonathan M, 764 A.2d at 756. The Connecticut Superior Court has recognized that
a petition for a new trial is an available method for raising the ineffectiveness claim. In re
Shanice P., 2000 WL 1618292 * 1 (Conn. Super. 2000).
128. R.G. v. State (In reA.G.), 27 P.3d 562, 564 n. 3 (Utah App. 2001).
129. C.N. W., 26 S.W.3d at 393.
130. In re J.MS., 43 S.W.3d 60, 64 (Tex. App. 2001). The court added that if the claim
is first brought on direct appeal, the review is limited to the record, which might not be
fully developed, and the parent who has failed to raise the issue in a post-trial motion "has
a difficult burden to overcome." Id.
131. In reMS., 115 S.W.3d 534, 549-50 (Tex. 2003).
132. AS. v. State (In re MD.(S)), 485 N.W.2d 52 (Wis. 1992). See also Brown County
v. Kathy C. (In re Chrissy MD.), 621 N.W.2d 386, 7 (Wis. App. 2000); Brown County v.
Neung S. (In re Ounkhm S.), 2000 Wisc. App. LEXIS 920.
133. State v. Machner, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Wis. App. 1979).
134. MD.(S.), 485 N.W. 2d at 56.
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record unless the parent has requested either a new trial or what
is known in that jurisdiction as a Ginther hearing. 135
C. Habeas Corpus
Very few cases have discussed the availability of habeas
corpus petitions for claims of ineffectiveness, but a Florida
Court of Apyeal has determined that a habeas action is
appropriate. 136 It rejected the use of direct appeal because the
appellate attorney is often the trial attorney, and because the
record is usually not sufficiently developed for the claim to
become apparent; it also noted that habeas corpus had been the
traditional means of raising the ineffectiveness claim in criminal
cases.'37 It held that a habeas petition had to be filed in the trial
court "without unreasonable delay"' 38 and suggested that the
doctrine of laches could bar the proceeding if there was
unnecessary delay. 139 The California courts also allow the use of
habeas corpus to raise the ineffectiveness claim. 140
Other states reject the use of habeas corpus. The
Connecticut Supreme Court held that a parent who claimed
ineffective assistance of counsel had standing to bring the
habeas petition, but that it was not an "appropriate vehicle by
which he may assert a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel."' 14 1 The court performed a Mathews v. Eldridge analysis
in rejecting the parent's argument that he had a due process right
to collaterally attack the termination order.142 It determined that
the government's interest in providing the child with a
135. Fam. Independence Agency v. Jones (In re S. MJ), 2001 WL 1654780 *9 (Dec. 21,
2001) (referring to People v. Ginther, 212 N.W.2d 922 (Mich. 1973)).
136. L. W. v. Dept. of Children & Fams., 812 So. 2d 551, 557 (Fla. 1st Dist. App. 2002).
One member of the three-judge panel disagreed with the conclusion that a collateral
proceeding should be the exclusive means by which to raise the ineffectiveness claims. Id.
at 560 (Wolf, J., concurring).
137. Id. at 557.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 557-58.
140. See e.g. Kristin H., 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 722; see also Orange County Soc. Serv. Agency
v. Olga A. (In re Eileen A.), 101 Cal. Rptr. 548, 551-56 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2000) (finding
ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, and discussing why direct appeal was
appropriate even though habeas is preferred method).
141. Jonathan M, 764 A.2d at 744.
142. Id. at 752-53.
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permanent home outweighed the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of parental rights, given the number of procedural
alternatives available to the parent.'
43
The Kansas Court of Appeals disallowed the habeas
procedure because a parent whose parental rights have been
terminated has no right to file a habeas writ. 144 The Utah Court
of Appeals suggested that habeas is unacceptable in the parental-
rights termination context because of the delay it would cause.
145
Federal habeas corpus is not an option after Lehman v.
Lycoming County Children's Services Agency, 146 in which
concerns of federalism 147 and a reluctance to expand federal
habeas into the area of child custody 148 led the Supreme Court to
reject the habeas petition of a mother whose parental rights had
been terminated in Pennsylvania. 149 The Court was particularly
concerned about the need for finality in child-custody cases and
the possibility of lessening a child's chances of adoption if
federal habeas were available to challenge termination orders.
150
The Court quoted at length from Sylvander v. New England
Home for Little Wanderers15' in which the First Circuit denied
the use of habeas in a child-custody case and suggested that
there is a sufficient number of other procedural vehicles
available to parents hoping to raise constitutional issues,
152
including appeal, certiorari, and the civil-rights statutes. 153
143. Id. at 753.
144. Cosgrove v. Kan. St. Dept. of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 786 P.2d 636, 638-39 (Kan.
App. 1990).
145. E.H., 880 P.2d at 13 n. 2.
146. 458 U.S. 502 (1982).
147. Id. at 512-13.
148. Id. at 511.
149. In re William C., 383 A.2d 1227 (Pa. 1978).
150. Lehman, 458 U.S. at 513.
151. 584 F.2d 1103 (lst Cir. 1978).
152. Lehman, 458 U.S. at 515 (quoting Sylvander, 584 F.2d at I1 11).
153. Sylvander, 584 F.2d at 1111.
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VII. A CRITIQUE OF EXISTING PROCEDURES FOR RAISING THE
INEFFECTIVENESS CLAIM IN PARENTAL-TERMINATION
PROCEEDINGS
It is apparent from the foregoing that most of the courts that
have allowed ineffectiveness claims in termination cases have
either required or permitted them to be raised on direct appeal.
An examination of the advantages and disadvantages of the
various means of bringing ineffectiveness claims illustrates why
the direct appeal is the best method.
The most persuasive reason in favor of direct appeal is that,
in most cases, it will consume the least amount of time. This is
particularly important because of the need to stabilize the
circumstances of the child. The longer there is uncertainty about
whether a termination order will withstand appeal, the longer the
child remains in limbo. The longer the child remains in limbo,
the greater the possibility of emotional damage to the child; and
the longer the child remains in the foster care system, the greater
the financial burden upon the state. Furthermore, the longer the
uncertainty about the finality of the termination order, the less
likely it is that prospective adopting parents will come forward.
From the parents' standpoint, the longer an erroneous
termination order remains in effect, the more detrimental it is to
them and their relationship with the child. This is because, in all
likelihood, once the termination order is entered, the parents are
not permitted to have contact with the child and the services that
they may have been receiving previously from the state agency
will have been terminated.
A direct appeal is likely to be faster than either a post-
judgment motion or a habeas proceeding in most cases. The
direct appeal has the time limits imposed by the statutes and
rules governing appeals, and the majority of states have enacted
expedited procedures for appeals of termination orders.1 54 In
154. Susan C. Wawrose, "Can We Go Home Now?": Expediting Adoption and
Termination of Parental Rights Appeals in Ohio State Courts, 4 J. App. Prac. & Process
257, 262 (2002) (stating that thirty-eight states expedite appeals in termination
proceedings); Stratton, supra n. 2, at 123-24.
Examples of rules expediting these appeals include Iowa. R. Ct. 8.21 (West 2004)
(notice of appeal to be filed in fifteen days); S.D. R. Civ. App. P. §§ 15-26A-6.1, 15-26A-
75 (LEXIS 2003) (shorter periods for filing notice and briefs in termination cases than in
other civil matters); and Wis. R. App. P. 809.107 (West 2003). See In re Estel A., 536
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contrast, motions under rules equivalent to Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(b)(6) have only a "reasonable" time as the limit.'55 Although
one court has held that fourteen months after the termination
order was not a reasonable time,' 56 it is possible that courts will
consider substantial time periods to be reasonable, depending
upon the reasons given for the delay. The Connecticut statue that
expressly allows a post-judgment motion to reopen or set aside a
judgment terminating parental rights, though, sets four months
as the time period within which the motion must be filed.
157
Of course, rules could be promulgated setting fairly short
time periods for post-judgment motions, or courts could allow
the effectiveness claims to be raised in motions for new trial,
which generally have a shorter time period than Rule 60(b)
motions. 158 A post-judgment process for effectiveness claims
with relatively short time periods would remedy one of the
disadvantages to the post-judgment method. Another
disadvantage, however, is that post-judgment motions involve
additional hearings in the trial court, which also means more
time. While it is possible for a court to design and implement a
N.W.2d 396 (Wis. App. 1995) (holding that court did not have power to enlarge the fifteen-
day appeal period). The National Council for Juvenile and Family Court Judges
recommends that the time period between the trial court's judgment terminating parental
rights and a decision by the appellate court should not exceed 150 days. Adoption
Guidelines, supra n. 5, at 40.
155. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (West 2004).
156. Tiffany N. v. Kareem W (In re Termination of Parental Rights to Shanay W.), 618
N.W.2d 273 (Wis. App. 2000). The court emphasized the need for finality in decisions
affecting a child's ability to maintain a stable family relationship, quoting from a
Wisconsin Supreme Court case regarding the concern for finality:
The legislature emphasized that courts should recognize that instability and
impermanence in family relationships are contrary to the welfare of children.
The legislature also entreated the courts to recognize the importance to children
of eliminating unreasonable periods while their parents try to correct the
conditions that prevent the child's return to the family.
Id. at *5-*6 (quoting Waukesha County v. Steven H. (In re Brittany Ann H.), 607 N.W.2d
607, 615 (Wis. 2000)).
157. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-212(a) (West 1991). See Jonathan M, 764 A.2d at 755-56.
158. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(b) has a ten-day time period. This shorter time limit may create
difficulties for the parent. Trial counsel may still be representing the parent, and therefore,
all the problems incurred when trial counsel raises an ineffectiveness claim are present.
Even if new counsel has been appointed, it would be difficult for the new counsel to gain
enough information about the representation by trial counsel to make a new trial motion on
the basis of ineffectiveness. See LaFave, supra n. 102, at 629-30 (discussing the difficulties
of utilizing post-verdict motions to raise Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness claims in
criminal cases).
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process that includes a trial court hearing for the purpose of
factual findings, realistic judges know that it is easier said than
done. Furthermore, to the extent that many claims of
ineffectiveness will be denied in the trial court and then
appealed, this process will be lengthier than one allowing the
ineffectiveness claim on appeal.
Nonetheless, in some cases it will be impossible to
determine the merits of an ineffectiveness claim from the appeal
record. This is probably the most serious disadvantage to raising
an ineffectiveness claim on direct appeal. However, in many
cases the merits of an ineffectiveness claim may be determined
on the appeal record alone. In most of the cases cited in this
article in which an appellate court has found ineffective
assistance of counsel on appeal, it has done so on the basis of the
record before it, without remanding for a hearing.1 59 In an
Oregon case in which the court found that counsel was
inadequate on the basis of the trial record, the transcript
contained counsel's admission that he was not prepared for trial
and had not read the discovery material.1 60 The court was able to
conclude that it was not inevitable that the parent's rights would
have been terminated with adequate counsel.1 61 In another
Oregon case the claim of ineffectiveness was the failure of
counsel to file a timely notice of appeal, which was apparent on
the record, and the court found that counsel was inadequate. 1
62
When the record is insufficient for determining the merits
of ineffectiveness claims, appellate courts should allow a
remand to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on
ineffectiveness. This need not be done in every case, but should
be reserved for only those cases in which the parent persuades
the court that he or she is likely to prevail. For example, the
159. Gila County Juvenile Action, 637 P.2d at 743; Eileen A., 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 551-
56; Orcutt, 173 N.W.2d at 67-71; Rushing, 684 P.2d at 449-50; .C., 781 S.W.2d at 228;
Orneika ., 491 N.Y.S.2d at 78-79; In re McLemore, 2001 WL 266947 (Ohio App. 10th
Dist. Mar. 20, 2001); State ex rel. St. Office for Servs. to Children & Fams. v. Rogers (In re
Eldridge), 986 P.2d 726 (Or. App. 1999). But see Kristin H., 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 744
(concluding that record demonstrated that performance of attorney was inadequate, but
remanding for a hearing in the trial court on whether the performance was prejudicial).
160. Eldridge, 986 P.2d at 729.
161. Id. at 731.
162. State ex rel. St. Off. for Servs. to Children & Fams. v. Hammons, 10 P.3d 310, 313
(Or. App. 1999). The remedy was to allow the untimely appeal. Id. at 315.
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appellate court could require by rule that when appellate counsel
requests a remand in order to make the appropriate record,
counsel should do so in a motion' 63 that specifically describes
which actions or inactions of trial counsel constitute
ineffectiveness and include an offer of proof as to the evidence
that would be presented on remand. The offer of proof should
consist of affidavits from people with knowledge of counsel's
performance. For example, if the ineffectiveness consists of trial
counsel's failure to call necessary witnesses, the motion should
include affidavits from the parent that she requested the attorney
to call the witnesses, and affidavits from the witnesses
themselves about their proposed testimony. The appellate court
could then determine, in an expedited manner, whether the
ineffectiveness alleged appears clearly on the record and, if not,
whether the offer of proof is such that appellate counsel may be
able to establish ineffectiveness.164 If the appellate court grants
the remand request and orders a hearing for factual findings on
the ineffectiveness issue, it should retain jurisdiction over the
appeal. In this way delay would be minimized.
The other major disadvantage to the direct-appeal approach
is that trial counsel may still be representing the parent when the
notice of appeal has to be filed. However, this will also be true
for any process that must be initiated within a short time of the
163. It is common for appellate rules to contain a provision for the filing of motions. See
e.g. Fed. R. App. P. 27 (federal); Me. R. App. P. 10 (Maine).
164. In State ex rel. Children, Youth and Fams. Dept. v. David F., 911 P.2d 235 (N.M.
App. 1995), the New Mexico Court of Appeals, which hears ineffectiveness claims on
direct appeal, held that it does not remand a case to the trial court for an evidentiary
hearing unless the record on appeal shows a prima facie case of ineffectiveness. It defines a
prima facie case as one in which "(1) it appears from the record that counsel acted
unreasonably; (2) the appellate court cannot think of a plausible rational strategy or tactic
to explain counsel's conduct; and (3) the actions of counsel are prejudicial." Id. at 242. In
that case, however, after thoroughly examining all of the parents' ineffectiveness
contentions and the record, the court concluded that the parents' counsel was not
ineffective. In State ex rel. Children, Youth and Fams. Dept. v. Tammy S., 974 P.2d 158
(N.M. App. 1998), the court remanded an ineffectiveness claim for an evidentiary hearing
in the trial court where the mother's claim of ineffectiveness stemmed from the joint
representation by counsel of the mother and father even though the mother was a victim of
the father's domestic violence. The court quoted the prima facie test from David F., but
stated: "Alternatively, this Court has utilized the standard that remand for an evidentiary
hearing is required where a substantial question is raised concerning issues not adjudicated
at the termination hearing." Id. at 163.
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termination judgment. 65 Whenever it becomes apparent that an
ineffectiveness claim is going to be or should be brought, trial
counsel should seek to withdraw from the case and new counsel
should be appointed at the earliest possible time. It is unrealistic
and unworkable to expect trial counsel to raise ineffectiveness.
Court rules or statutes that require trial counsel to remain in the
case as appellate counsel present a particular problem.
166
A requirement that the ineffectiveness issue be raised on
direct appeal could create the consequence that if it is not raised
on appeal, it will be considered waived or barred. However, in
the criminal law context, the Supreme Court has held that a
federal defendant who could have raised an ineffectiveness
claim on direct appeal is not barred from raising the claim in a
post-conviction proceeding.' 67 A rule that may better fit the
termination setting would bar a claim of ineffectiveness if not
raised on direct appeal unless the incident of ineffectiveness was
unknown to the parents and not reasonably apparent to appellate
counsel.
From the perspective of the child, the adoptive parents, and
the state agency, the direct appeal is the best route. In spite of
the few disadvantages to the direct-appeal approach, the relative
speed of the direct appeal, when compared to post-judgment or
165. Any process with a short time limit will require a parent to decide quickly whether
an ineffectiveness claim should be raised. However, most parents will have formed an
opinion, by the time they receive the termination decision, as to whether they believe their
attorney was effective. A parent may not be able to articulate the claim, but she will know
whether her attorney represented her in the manner that she expected and aimed for the
result she wanted. For example, a parent will know if the attorney called her witnesses to
testify; whether the attorney sought to obtain her side of the story or met her for the first
time in the courthouse on the day of the hearing; whether the lawyer reviewed a trial
strategy with her; and whether the attorney acted in a professional manner toward her, the
court, and the process. The parent will not know the technical aspects to her defense, such
as whether the attorney properly made evidentiary objections, and there may be aspects of
the parent's case that the attorney should have told her but did not, such as a settlement
offer that was not communicated. Nonetheless, in most situations in which an
ineffectiveness claim should be brought, the parent will have formed an opinion, in a
relatively short time, as to whether the lawyer's representation was adequate.
166. See e.g. 22 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 4006 (West Supp. 2003) (requiring attorney in the
trial court proceeding to continue representing the client "unless otherwise ordered by the
court"); Brown v. Div. of Fam. Servs., 803 A.2d 948, 958 (Del. 2002) (describing Del. S.
Ct. R. 26.1 as imposing "a continuing obligation upon the attorney who represented the
parents in the Family Court").
167. Massaro v. U.S., 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003).
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habeas proceedings, even with the occasional remand for an
evidentiary hearing, outweighs the disadvantages.
Regardless of the procedural vehicle, there should be an
absolute time bar for the ineffectiveness issue to be brought
forward, and a requirement that in no case may the claim be
made after an adoption of the child has been finalized. 68 If
prospective adoptive parents knew that an adoption could be
jeopardized by a court ruling for a parent on an ineffectiveness
claim, the number of people willing to adopt children from
families in which an involuntary termination of parental rights
had taken place would drop precipitously. Children would
remain much longer in the foster care system.
In addition to suggesting that courts adopt the procedure of
allowing ineffectiveness claims to be raised on direct appeal
with a provision for remand when required, I also suggest that
the procedure be set forth in a court rule. A rule allows all
parties to know beforehand the appropriate procedure. In
addition to promoting certainty, a rule would promote efficiency
by reducing disputes about procedure, and the rule-making
process also permits input and advice from a wide range of
interested people and institutions.
VIII. STANDARDS FOR DETERMINING INEFFECTIVENESS IN
PARENTAL-TERMINATION CASES
Once a suitable procedural vehicle has brought the
ineffectiveness claim of a parent to a court for resolution, the
court must decide upon the appropriate standard for judging the
ineffectiveness claim. The criminal arena, the birthplace of the
claim, has developed a rigid standard for ineffectiveness based
on Strickland v. Washington.169 That standard has been adopted
by a number of courts deciding claims of ineffective assistance
in parental-termination cases, often without analysis of its
applicability in a non-criminal context.
168. The Connecticut statute states that no motion to reopen a judgment terminating
parental rights may be granted if a decree of adoption has been finalized. Conn. Gen. Stat.
§ 45a-719 (West 2004).
169. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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A. The Strickland Standard
The criminal standard was announced in Strickland,170 in
which the Supreme Court delineated the two-part test for
judging whether counsel in a criminal trial or death sentence
proceeding was ineffective:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance
was deficient. This requires demonstrating that counsel
made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as
the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment. Second, the defendant must convince the
court that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.
This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious
as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose
result is reliable.
17 1
The shorthand term for the first component is the performance
prong, and the second component is known as the prejudice
prong.
With regard to the performance prong, the Court held that
there is a strong presumption "that counsel's conduct falls
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, 172
which presumption the defendant must overcome, and judicial
scrutiny of the lawyer's performance is "highly deferential."
' 173
"[T]he performance inquiry must be whether counsel's
assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances."
' 174
Furthermore, a defendant who raises an ineffectiveness claim
must be specific in identifying the acts or omissions by the
attorney that give rise to the claim.
175
With regard to the prejudice prong, the Court said:
The defendant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different. A
170. Id.
171. Id. at 687.
172. Id. at 689.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 688.
175. Id. at 690.
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reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome.1
7 6
When a conviction is challenged, this means a reasonable
probability that, but for the lawyer's errors, the factfinder would
have had a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. 177 The
Supreme Court also noted that a court does not have to decide
both prongs. If a defendant fails to demonstrate prejudice, for
example, a court need look no further.' 78 In a small subset of
cases, where there has been an actual or constructive denial of
counsel, prejudice is presumed. 179
The Strickland standard has been adopted in most
jurisdictions for determining ineffectiveness of counsel in
termination proceedings. 180  Some courts, however, follow a
176. Id. at 694.
177. Id. The Supreme Court has held that when the claim is ineffectiveness at the
sentencing stage and the defendant can demonstrate that counsel's error led to even a slight
increase in the sentence, the defendant has shown prejudice. Glover v. U.S., 531 U.S. 198,
204 (2001).
178. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
179. In United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), a case decided the same day as
Strickland, the Court said that in some cases the circumstances were "so likely to prejudice
the accused" that prejudice does not have to be proven. Id. at 658. In Roe v. Flores-Ortega,
528 U.S. 470 (2000), the Supreme Court attempted to clarify when prejudice can be
presumed. In cases involving "mere 'attorney error,"' Strickland's prejudice prong is
applicable. Id. at 482. In those situations where counsel was denied, either actually or
constructively, the adversary process is presumptively unreliable, and, therefore, prejudice
is presumed. Id. at 483-84. But when the proceeding in question was presumptively
reliable, a showing of actual prejudice is required. Id. at 484.
180. People in re V.MR., 768 P.2d 1268, 1270 (Colo. App. 1989); L. W. v. Dept. of
Children & Fams., 812 So. 2d 551, 556 (Fla. 1st Dist. App. 2002); In re A.H.P., 500 S.E.2d
418, 422 (Ga. App. 1998); KR.K., 631 N.E.2d 449, 454-55 (holding that Strickland applies
to ineffectiveness claims in abuse and neglect cases); People v. Bilyeu (In re D.B.), 615
N.E.2d 1336, 1342 (I1. App. 4th Dist. 1993); Tavorn v. Marion County Off. of Fan. &
Children (In re Involuntary Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of J. T.), 750 N.E.2d
1261, 1265 (Ind. App. 2000); In re D.W., 385 N.W.2d 570, 579-80 (Iowa 1986); Rushing,
684 P.2d at 449-50 (Kan. App. 1984); Lenawee County Dept. of Soc. Servs. v. Currier (In
re Rogers), 409 N.W.2d 486, 488 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987); In re J.MK.A., 1997 WL 770399
*3 (Minn. App. Dec. 16, 1997); N.J. Div. of Youth and Fam. Servs. v. V.K. (In re J.K.), 565
A.2d 706, 712 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1989); In re Colbert, 2000 WL 1687602 *3 (Ohio
App. 1 th Dist. Nov. 9, 2000); Chappell v. State (In re K.L.C.), 12 P.3d 478, 480-81 (Okla.
Civ. App. 2000); State v. Christensen (In re C.C.), 907 P.2d 241, 245 (Okla. App. 1995); In
re MS., 115 S.W.3d 534, 544, 545 (Tex. 2003) (adopting Strickland, and listing other
states that have adopted it); E.H., 880 P.2d at 13; MB., 647 A.2d at 1004; Brown County
Dept. of Human Servs. v. Neung S. (In re Ounkhm S.), 2000 WL 1341883 10 (Wis. App.
2000). See D.S.H.S. v. A.S. (In re MI.S.), 95 Wash. App. 1049, *5 n. 1 (Wash. App. May
24, 1999) (applying Strickland test without formally adopting it, and listing cases that have
adopted Strickland).
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Strickland standard without mentioning Strickland.'18 In almost
all of the cases in which Strickland is applied, either expressly or
impliedly, the courts decline to find ineffectiveness. In some
cases this is because the courts do not find that counsel's
performance was defective;' 82 in other cases it is because the
courts do not find that the performance prejudiced the parent;' 83
and in some the courts conclude that the parent has met neither
prong of the Strickland test.184 In a recent case, in which the
Texas Supreme Court adopted the Strickland standard, the court
concluded that counsel's error may have amounted to ineffective
assistance and remanded the case for a determination as to
whether the error was unjustified and prejudicial.'85
There are very few exceptions to the general observation
that courts applying Strickland usually fail to find
ineffectiveness. The exceptions are primarily in those cases in
which the courts presume prejudice, either explicitly or
implicitly, because of the actual or constructive denial of
counsel. For example, in a Kansas case, the court concluded that
the attorney's withdrawal from the case in mid-trial constituted a
181. See Kristin H., 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 741; In re Alexander V., 613 A.2d 780, 787
(Conn. 1992); In re V.K, 766 A.2d 958, 963-64 (D.C. App. Nov. 2, 2000); State v. A. W (In
re W.L. W.), 702 N.E.2d 606, 609 (Il. App. 1998); Bickel v. St. Joseph County Dept. of
Pub. Welfare (In re D. T.), 547 N.E.2d 278, 282 (Ind. App. 1989); Care and Protection of
Stephen, 514 N.E.2d at 1091; Annette F., 911 P.2d at 241-42; In re Oghenekevebe, 473
S.E.2d 393, 396 (N.C. App. 1989) (citing a criminal case).
182. See e.g. In re K.ML., 516 S.E.2d 363, 366 (Ga. App. 1999); Chappell v. State (In
re K.L.C.), 12 P.3d 478 (Okla. Ct. Civ. App. 2000).
183. See e.g. In re Matthew S., 758 A.2d 459, 461 (Conn. App. 2000); W.L. W., 702
N.E.2d at 609-10; In re B.N., 2001 WL 57987 *2 (Iowa App. Jan. 24, 2001); James W.H.,
849 P.2d at 1082; Colbert, 2000 WL 1687602 at *3; E.H., 880 P.2d at 14.
184. See e.g. In re Mariah S., 763 A.2d 71, 83 (Conn. App. 2000); In re A.H.P., 500
S.E.2d 418, 422 (Ga. App. 1998); People v. Denise M (In re D.M), 631 N.E.2d 341, 345
(Ill. App. 1994); D.T., 547 N.E.2d at 282; In re K.G., 2000 WL 145070 *4, *4-*5 (Iowa
App. Feb. 9, 2000); Rogers, 409 N.W.2d at 489.
185. In re MS., 115 S.W.3d 534, 548-49 (Tex. 2003). Trial counsel had failed to move
for a new trial, a procedural requisite to preserving the issue of the sufficiency of the
evidence. In an interesting Mathews v. Eldridge analysis of the issue preservation
requirement, the Texas Supreme Court concluded that when counsel failed unjustifiably to
follow the established procedure and thereby failed to preserve the issue of the sufficiency
of the evidence for appellate review, the risk of erroneous deprivation was too high. Id. at
549. The court remanded the matter to the intermediate appellate court to determine
whether counsel's defective performance caused harm. Id. at 550.
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complete denial of counsel. 186 Citing Strickland and Cronic, the
court reversed the termination judgment and ordered a new
trial. 187 In a New York case the mother's attorney failed to
appear for the termination hearing, and the court implicitly
presumed prejudice.' 88
B. The Geist Fundamental Fairness Standard
Not all courts employ the Strickland standard in parental-
rights cases. The leading case articulating a different standard is
State ex rel. Juvenile Dept. of Multnomah County v. Geist (In re
Geist), 189 in which the Oregon Supreme Court expressly rejected
application of the Strickland standard for determining
ineffectiveness. 19 Geist is the only case in which a state's
highest court has examined the rationale for the Strickland
standard and explained why it is not appropriate in parental-
termination cases. 191 Choosing to apply what is now known as
the fundamental-fairness standard, the Geist court stated that it
was adopting "a standard which seeks to determine whether a
186. Rushing, 684 P.2d at 450. The father was not present at the termination hearing,
and after the government presented its first two witnesses, both state workers who testified
that he was largely unknown to them, the father's attorney believed that there was nothing
further he could do. The hearing resumed, and the only evidence of the father's unfitness
came from the mother's testimony. The mother testified that the father had not supported
the child in two years; that they had been separated; and that he had only sporadic contact
with the child. Id. at 446-48.
187. Id. at 450. In contrast, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a mother was not
entitled to substitute counsel once she had discharged her appointed attorney, who was
"overworked and overburdened" and not representing her effectively. In re Bryce T., 764
A.2d 718, 720 (R.I. 2001). The mother requested that another attorney be appointed, but
the trial court refused, and the mother represented herself. The reviewing court also found
that the discharged attorney was not ineffective, and that it was doubtful that appointing
new counsel would have changed the outcome.
188. Constance R. v. Erie County Dept. of Soc. Servs. (In re James R.), 661 N.Y.S.2d
160, 161 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997). Not only did counsel fail to appear for the hearing, but
also failed to clear up a misunderstanding that led the mother to miss the hearing.
Furthermore, after the termination order was entered by default, mother's counsel said she
would bring a motion to vacate the judgment but did not. Id.
189. 796 P.2d 1193 (Or. 1990).
190. Id. at 1201-02.
191. Appellate courts in Missouri, Pennsylvania, and Washington have all rejected
Strickland and applied a different standard. See J.C., 781 S.W.2d at 228; In re Adoption of
T.MF., 573 A.2d 1035 (Pa. Super. 1990); Moseley, 660 P.2d 315.
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termination proceeding was "fundamentally fair," 92  and
referred to the Strickland standard as "more stringent." 9 3
In Geist, the court first noted that differing substantive and
procedural rules have long been applied in civil and criminal
cases, and also considered additional factors unique to parental-
termination cases.' 94 Courts dealing with children function in a
parens patriae capacity, and the goal is to act in the best interests
of a child. 195 When a parent is unable or unwilling to provide
appropriate care, the child's best interests may require the
termination of the parent's rights. "To secure a parent's rights in
the context of those underlying determinations, courts seek to
determine whether the proceedings were fundamentally fair. ' 196
The court went on to state that the essence of fundamental
fairness is the right to be heard at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner. "The requirements of notice, adequate
counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and standards of
proof flow from this emphasis."' 97 The court then explained that
"although no client has a constitutional or statutory right to a
'perfect' defense, fundamental fairness requires that appointed
counsel exercise professional skill and judgment.' 98 Tactical
decisions, such as the choice to call a witness or to ask particular
questions of a witness, or to make a certain argument, will not
amount to ineffectiveness of counsel unless a court finds that no
responsible attorney in those particular circumstances would
have chosen that tactic. 99 Like the Strickland standard, the
fundamental-fairness standard looks to the "totality of the
circumstances" in determining the adequacy of counsel.2 °°
The Geist approach also requires the party challenging the
adequacy of counsel to demonstrate that her lawyer's
ineffectiveness prejudiced her case. 20 1 Strickland describes the
prejudice prong as requiring "a reasonable probability that, but
192. 796 P.2d at 1201 (citing McKeiver v. Pa., 403 U.S. 528 (1971)).
193. Id. at 1203.
194. Id. at 1202.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1203 (citations omitted).
197. Id.
198. Id. (citation omitted).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1204.
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for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different." 20 2 Geist requires a showing that the
attorney's performance denied the parent a fair trial and is
sufficiently poor to call the trial court's decision "into serious
question."2 Furthermore, the trial court's decision terminating
parental rights should not be reversed if the reviewing court is
satisfied that even with adequate counsel the result would
"inevitably" have been the same.
204
Applying the fundamental-fairness standard to the facts of
the case before it, the court decided that the record did not
demonstrate that the mother's attorney was ineffective. 20 5 The
court first determined that the record was adequate to allow it to
reach the ineffectiveness issue.206 The mother claimed that her
attorney's trial preparation was inadequate, that the attorney's
skills were deficient, and that the attorney based the mother's
defense on post-traumatic-stress disorder and battered-woman's
syndrome, which theories the mother claimed were untenable.20 7
However, at the termination hearing, the mother stated on the
record that she was satisfied with the representation provided to
her by trial counsel.20 8 Upon review of the record, the Oregon
Supreme Court found that the mother's counsel
advocated vigorously for her, sought and obtained
discovery, used an investigator, interviewed witnesses,
briefed the pertinent legal issues, spent appropriate time
and energy preparing for trial, effectively cross-examined
the state's witnesses, and called witnesses in suort of her
theory of the case, which, we find, was tenable.
Two cases from the Oregon Court of Appeals illustrate the
practical application of Geist's fundamental-fairness standard. In
both, the court found that counsel was inadequate. In State ex
rel. State Office for Services to Children & Families v. Thomas
202. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
203. Geist, 796 P.2d at 1204.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1204-05.
206. Id. at 1204.
207. Id. at 1205.
208. Id. at 1198-99, 1205.
209. Id. The court did not explain how the record demonstrated the interviewing of
witnesses by the attorney or the time and energy spent by the attorney in preparation.
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(In re Stephens),21 ° the father failed to appear for the termination
hearing. He was in a residential treatment center at the time of
the hearing, and his attorney did not obtain a subpoena for his
attendance or notify personnel at the center about the need to
have the father at the hearing. 2 11 Although counsel was present
at the hearing, he made no opening statement except to say that
his client could be a good father and was in treatment, and he
also made no closing argument. He did not call witnesses, offer
any exhibits, or cross-examine most of the witnesses.212 Counsel
also admitted that he was not prepared for trial, in part, because
of the father's absence.213 The court concluded that the
attorney's lack of preparation and failure to advocate any theory
for the father rendered his performance inadequate.214
With regard to the prejudice prong of the Geist standard,
the court noted that the father was undergoing substance-abuse
treatment,2 15 and it was unwilling to assume a poor prognosis.
The court stated:
Essential to our conclusion is the fact that the trial court
was not given the opportunity to judge the credibility of the
father's case or his evidence, whatever father's case and
evidence may in fact be.... In a situation, as here, where
father wanted to put on a case, where there is some credible
evidence that father could be a resource for child, and
where counsel has not effectively advocated any theory of
father's case, father has not been heard. Accordingly, we
will not conclude that the result would have inevitably been
the same.216
In State ex rel. State Office for Services to Children &
Families v. Rogers (In re Eldridge),217 trial counsel at the
commencement of the termination hearing explained to the
210. 12 P.3d 537 (Or. App. 2000).
211. Stephens, 12 P.3d at 541-42. The Court of Appeals noted, that there was an
indication that the father wanted to attend the hearing, but that if he left the treatment
center without being subpoenaed, it was likely that his probation would have been violated.
Id.
212. Id. at 543.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 543-44.
215. Id. at 544 (emphasis in original).
216. Id.
217. 986 P.2d 726 (Or. App. 1999).
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judge that he was not prepared for the trial; that he had never
talked to his client, the children's mother, who lived on the other
side of the state; that he had not read the 800-page agency file
that had been furnished to him two days earlier; and that he had
come to court only to withdraw from the case. 218 Counsel then
moved to withdraw or, in the alternative, for a continuance, and
the court denied both motions, but allowed a ten-minute recess
for the attorney to prepare. 219 The trial court blamed the mother
for counsel's lack of preparation because she had failed to keep
in touch with him. 22 On appeal, the Oregon Court of Appeals
held that the termination proceeding was fundamentally unfair
because of counsel's inadequacy.
22
'
The state agency argued that there was no prejudice to the
mother because she had failed to keep in touch with her lawyer
and because there was no indication that she would be any better
able to care for these children than she was able to care for
another child who was the subject of a prior termination order.
The appellate court disagreed, stating that the record showed
that the mother, who previously had been homeless and
suffering from substance abuse, was at the time of the
termination hearing living in a clean home large enough for her
two children, and there was no indication of current alcohol or
drug problems. The court also said that while the record showed
that the mother had not been good at "follow through" with the
social workers and her attorney, who were on the other side of
the state their attempts at working with her were "half-hearted,
at best."
'122
Missouri has also adopted, for termination cases, what has
been termed a more "relaxed" standard223 or a "lesser"
requirement 224 than the Strickland standard. In J C., the Missouri
Court of Appeals found that the parents were deprived of
adequate counsel, holding that the test of ineffectiveness was
whether the attorney was effective in providing a meaningful
218. Eldridge, 986 P.2d at 729.
219. Id. The mother also requested that the attorney be allowed to withdraw. Id.
220. Id. at 730-31.
221. Id. at 731.
222. Id. at 731.
223. J.C., 781 S.W.2d at 228 (quoting Moseley, 660 P.2d at 318).
224. James W.H., 849 P.2d at 1082.
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hearing. 22  The parents' counsel was passive throughout the
termination hearing; he stipulated to the admission of all reports;
he called no witnesses, not even the parents. In fact, the parents,
who were in the courthouse, were not present in the courtroom
during the hearing. 226  The appellate court reversed the
termination order, stating that "[t]he right to counsel means
nothing if the attorney does not advocate for his client and
provide his client with a meaningful and adversarial hearing., 22
7
The court did not, however, discuss the prejudice to the parents
caused by the attorney's performance or explicitly state that it
was presuming prejudice.
Statements in the Pennsylvania Superior Court's reported
decisions indicate that it uses a fundamental-fairness standard
but its standard appears to be stricter even than Strickland.228
The mother in one Pennsylvania case claimed that her attorney
failed to call witnesses who would have testified that she had a
possibility of recovering from drug addiction. The court said that
225. JC., 781 S.W.2d at 228-29. After citing several cases in which the Strickland test
was applied, the Missouri court stated: "Other states have relaxed the criminal standard and
have held the test of ineffectiveness to be that 'if it appears from the record that an attorney
was not effective in providing a meaningful hearing, due process guaranties have not been
met."' Id. at 228 (quoting Moseley, 660 P.2d at 318).
226. J.C., 781 S.W.2d at 228.
227. Id. at 228-29. The JC. court relied on Moseley, a pre-Strickland case from
Washington. "Procedural fairness" is the term used by the court in Moseley for the standard
it applied to determine the ineffectiveness of counsel in a termination case. Moseley, 660
P.2d at 318: "[I]f it appears from the record that an attorney was not effective in providing
a meaningful hearing, due process guaranties have not been met." In Moseley, the mother
claimed ineffective assistance because her counsel did not develop details of an automobile
accident that had occurred eleven years earlier. The Court of Appeals, however, concluded
that the trial court was aware of the accident and the impact it had on the mother's life, and
that counsel's failure to highlight it further did not deprive the mother of a meaningful
hearing. Id. at 318-19. A more recent Washington appeal in which the court applied the
Strickland standard is D.S.H.S. v. A.S. (In re MI.S.), 1999 WL 325442 (Wash. App. May
24, 1999).
228. In re Adoption of T.MF., 573 A.2d 1035 (Pa. Super. 1990). The court phrased the
question in the case as "[I]f the evidence was so convincing and overwhelming that,
pursuant to statute, termination of parental rights was mandated, may ineffectiveness of
counsel be a basis for setting aside that finding?" Id. at 1039. The court stated that
ineffectiveness in parental-termination cases is not as serious as in criminal cases because
the role of the lawyer in termination cases does not carry the same impact as in criminal
cases. Id. at 1042. The court concluded that, upon a review of the record as a whole, an
appellate court must determine whether the attorney's ineffectiveness was the cause of the
termination order. If it is unlikely that the result in the case would have been different in
spite of a more perfect representation by the attorney, the termination order must stand. Id.
at 1044.
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such testimony-in light of the overwhelming evidence of drug
abuse-would not have been believed.229 The court concluded
that the hearing was fundamentally fair and any ineffectiveness
by the attorney "played no part in the result. 23 °
C. The Practical Differences between the Strickland and Geist
Standards
Is there an actual and practical difference between the
fundamental-fairness standard as articulated in Geist and the
Strickland standard? At least one court has suggested that the
standards are essentially the same. 231 Others have suggested that
the results under the two standards may not differ. 232  A
comparison of cases with similar facts decided under the
different standards demonstrates, however, that there is a
difference in practical application.
(1) The Performance-of-Counsel Prong
The performance of counsel is the focus of the first prong
of both the Strickland standard and the fundamental-fairness
test. The Strickland inquiry is whether counsel's performance
was reasonable under all of the circumstances. 2 33 Under Geist,the court looks at the totality of circumstances and determines
229. Id. at 1045.
230. Id. One of the judges who wrote a separate opinion stated that ineffectiveness
should be more difficult to prove in a termination case than in a criminal case because of
the extraordinary need for finality in the termination case. Id. at 1055 (Beck, J. concurring).
He would require parents to make a "strong showing" of ineffectiveness. Id. (Beck, J.
concurring). Another separate opinion found essentially no difference between the standard
that the majority claimed to be using and the standard in criminal cases. Id. at 1046
(Montemuro & Johnson, JJ., concurring and dissenting).
231. E.H., 880 P.2d at 13 n. 2. ("We believe that Geist essentially adopts the Strickland
test in holding that the parent must show inadequate performance by counsel and that the
inadequacy prejudiced the parent's case.")
232. James W.H., 849 P.2d 1079 at 1082 (describing Strickland as the majority position,
and noting that although "contrary authority appears to provide lesser standards,.. we are
not certain that the result reached would have been different under the criminal law
standard."). See also L. W v. Dept. of Children & Fams., 812 So. 2d 551, 556 (Fla. 1st Dist.
App. 2002) (applying Strickland and stating that "[i]t is not clear to us how these civil
standards of ineffective assistance of counsel differ in practice from the criminal standard
announced in Strickland')
233. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
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whether the parent was denied a fair trial because of counsel's
performance.234 With both standards the burden of proof is on
the person claiming ineffective assistance of counsel.235
Strickland calls for a "strong" presumption that counsel's
performance was adequate, with a "highly deferential" review of
23the attorney's performance, 236 whereas Geist does not mention
any presumption of adequacy. 27
It is likely that in both Stephens and Eldridge237 the Oregon
court would not have come to the same result on the
performance prong if it had applied the Strickland standard. The
Stephens opinion does not state what attempts, if any, the
attorney made to assist the father, who was at a substance-abuse
treatment center, to obtain permission to leave the center so that
he could attend the termination hearing. In Strickland, the Court
said the reasonableness of an attorney's conduct could be
"determined or substantially influenced by the defendant's own
,,238statement or actions. A court using the Strickland standard
would likely determine that it was reasonable for the attorney to
expect that the father would appear at the hearing on his own
unless he notified the attorney that there was a problem.
Strickland's presumption that counsel's performance was
adequate would not have been overcome in Stephens without a
showing that counsel had a duty to ensure the presence of his
client at the hearing, or that the attorney's failure to do so was
unreasonable.
In Eldridge the mother apparently never attempted to make
contact with her attorney even though he had been appointed
several months earlier. Because counsel had not heard from the
mother, he did not prepare for the termination hearing. In a
Strickland jurisdiction, a court would likely say that the
mother's own conduct substantially influenced her counsel's
lack of preparation. Given Strickland's presumption of the
reasonableness of attorney performance and highly deferential
manner of reviewing that performance, it may, then, be
reasonable for counsel in a Strickland jurisdiction who has not
234. Geist, 796 P.2d at 1203.
235. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690; Geist, 796 P.2d at 1203.
236. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
237. For additional discussion of the facts in these cases, see supra at 218-20.
238. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691.
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heard from the parent to assume that he does not need to prepare
for the hearing.
The Missouri Court of Appeals upheld an ineffectiveness
claim in JC., in which the parents' counsel was passive through
the hearing, did not object to any of the reports that composed
the state's entire case, and did not bring the parents into the
courtroom. The appellate court concluded that the attorney's
failure to advocate for the parents deprived them of a
meaningful opportunity to be heard.24  In a Strickland
jurisdiction, however, the failure to demonstrate what adequate
counsel would have presented on behalf of the parents or what
documents an effective attorney reasonably would have objected
to, and why, would have been fatal to the ineffectiveness claim.
In an Oklahoma case applying Strickland,24 1 the mother
claimed that her attorney was ineffective. She was serving a jail
sentence for grand larceny at the time of the termination trial,242
her lawyer had not been in touch with her for several months,
and he did not know that she was incarcerated.243 At the trial the
mother asked that her attorney withdraw from representing her
because he was not prepared.244 The trial court blamed the
mother for not keeping in touch with her attorney, and told her
to choose between keeping her present attorney and representing
herself. She chose the former. 243 The mother's attorney was able
to interview some witnesses before they testified because the
trial went into a second day.246 The appellate court, applying
Strickland, found that the mother had not shown that her counsel
was deficient.247 If this appellate court had applied the standard
used by the Oregon court in Eldridge, however, it would have
focused on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding and
concluded that counsel's lack of preparation constituted
inadequate performance.
239. This determination may depend upon the practice in the jurisdiction: Must the
court-appointed attorney contact the parent, or is the parent to contact the attorney?
240. J.C.., 781 S.W.2d at 228-29.
241. Chappell v. State (In re K.L.C.), 12 P.3d 478 (Okla. Civ. App. 2000).
242. Id. at 479.
243. Id. at481.
244. Id.
245. Id. The court first attempted to reschedule the matter, but was unable to do so. Id.
246. Id. at 482.
247. Id.
INEFFECTIVE-ASSISTANCE CLAIMS IN PARENTAL-RIGHTS CASES 225
A Vermont case 248 also illustrates the practical differences
between the two standards. The father had been accused of
sexually abusing his two children. The termination hearing, in
which the father's attorney zealously represented him during the
first few trial days, took seven days, spread over several
months. 249 Prior to the fifth day of trial, the attorney learned that
the father had been charged with sexually abusing his two
stepchildren, and that the allegations were similar to those made
by the children who were the subjects of the termination
proceeding. The father's attorney then attempted unsuccessfully
to withdraw from the case, telling the court that he could no
longer represent the father and that he had serious doubts about
the father's conduct. 25 Instead of calling the large number of
witnesses that the attorney originally planned to present, he
called only four, including the father and the foster parents. The
direct examination of the witnesses was brief. On appeal, the
father argued that counsel's inadequate performance was shown
by the motion to withdraw, the attorney's statement to the court
that he had serious doubts about the father, the brevity of the
father's case in chief and the failure to call the additional
witnesses. Applying the Strickland standard, the court noted that
the father did not specify what additional evidence would have
come from the witnesses who were not called, and concluded
that the father failed to show that his counsel was inadequate.
25 1
It is possible to view this attorney's performance, as the
Vermont court implicitly did, as warranted by the strategic or
tactical decisions he had to make when the new sexual-abuse
allegations came to light. It is also possible to view the case as
denying the father a fair trial once the attorney moved to
withdraw, because the attorney effectively abandoned the father
after that point in the process. If the case is viewed from the
latter perspective and the fundamental-fairness standard is
applied, the attorney's performance would appear to be
inadequate.
248. MB., 647 A.2d 1001.
249. Id. at 1003.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 1005. The court also concluded that the father failed to specify the ways in
which any incompetence of counsel prejudiced his case to the extent that it could infer a
reasonable probability of a different outcome. Id.
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(2) The Prejudice Prong
Both Strickland and Geist require a showing of prejudice.
Under Strickland, this means that the parent must demonstrate
"a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different." 252 The Geist prejudice test is whether counsel's
inadequate performance denied the parent a fair trial, and
whether the result would have been the same if the parent had
253adequate counsel. The prejudice prongs of both standards are
articulated in similar fashion, and it is difficult to discern from
the words alone whether the results obtained would differ
depending upon which standard was used. Both seem to have a
"but for" test: a requirement that the parent show that but for the
attorney's performance, the parent would have prevailed.
Regardless, however, of whether the verbal descriptions of the
two prejudice prongs indicate that similar or dissimilar results
would be obtained, in practice the results prove to differ.
For example, in Stephens,254 it appears that the court shifted
the burden of showing prejudice from the father to the state. The
opinion does not recite what testimony the father would have
given if he had been at the hearing or if his lawyer had been
competent, except that the court reports that the record contained
evidence that the father was undergoing substance-abuse
treatment, was working on his domestic-violence issues, and
was loving and gentle to the child. 5 The court said that it did
not know what evidence the father could present about his
treatment progress, but it would not assume that his prognosis
was poor.2 6 Under a Strickland standard, the father would have
had to come forward with evidence that would have been
presented if he had received adequate representation, and that
evidence would have had to demonstrate a probability that his
parental rights would not have been terminated. Without that
evidence, it is difficult to see how he could have prevailed on
the Strickland prejudice prong. Although the court seems to rely
252. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
253. Geist, 796 P.2d at 1204.
254. 12 P.3d 537.
255. Stephens, 12 P.3d at 540.
256. Id. at 544.
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on the attorney's lack of a theory of the case, there is no
suggestion as to what theory counsel could have presented that
would have been likely to result in a different outcome. There is
consequently a strong likelihood that Stephens would have
turned out differently under the Strickland prejudice prong.
In Eldridge257 the Oregon court found prejudice despite the
state's argument that the termination of the mother's parental
rights was inevitable. The record showed that the mother had a
home where she could live with the children, and there was no
evidence of current substance abuse. The court noted that
although the record showed that the mother had been homeless
with a serious alcohol problem a few years earlier, she now had
a clean home with enough space for her children. She had two
prior drug convictions, but there was no evidence of a current
drug or alcohol problem. She had not cooperated with the social
workers or her attorney, but the record showed that the efforts of
the social workers and her attorney were half-hearted. Thus, the
court said, it could not find that it was inevitable that her
parental rights would be terminated.25 8 The court's analysis,
however, relies more on what the record doesn't show than it
does on any affirmative demonstration by the mother of a
reasonable probability that her parental rights would not have
been terminated if her attorney had been prepared. Strickland
requires a greater showing of prejudice than this.
Likewise, in J. C,259 the failure of the parents to make any
demonstration as to what their witnesses would have presented,
or what theory or defense would have been made for them by an
adequate attorney, goes to the prejudice prong as well as to the
performance prong. In a Strickland jurisdiction, the court would
require some showing that the outcome would have been
different unless it were willing to presume prejudice.
It is arguable that a Strickland jurisdiction may be willing
to presume prejudice in cases with facts similar to those in
Stephens, Eldridge, and J.C.2 60 A presumption of prejudice is
257. 986 P.2d 726.
258. Eldridge, 986 P.2d at 731.
259. 781 S.W.2d 226.
260. Geist does not mention a presumption of prejudice or suggest that there are
circumstances in which prejudice need not be shown. Given the emphasis in Geist on
fairness, however, it seems likely that a jurisdiction employing the fundamental-fairness
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doubtful, however, because in all three cases there was
representation, albeit minimal, by the attorneys. Following the
Supreme Court's decision in Flores-Ortega,26 1 it is not likely
that minimal participation by an attorney will lead to a court's
presuming prejudice. Instead, courts may view these cases as
involving "mere attorney error,' 262 which makes the prejudice
prong of Strickland applicable, and refuse to presume prejudice.
Nonetheless, particularly in J. C., there does appear to have been
a failure by trial counsel to subject the state's case to
"meaningful adversarial testing," which under Cronic would be
a sufficient basis on which to presume prejudice.263
With regard to both the performance and prejudice prongs,
then, these few cases from Oregon, Missouri, Oklahoma, and
Vermont illustrate that there can be a real and practical
difference in the outcome of ineffectiveness claims between
jurisdictions that apply the fundamental-fairness standard of
Geist and those that have adopted Strickland.
IX. A FRAMEWORK FOR DETERMINING THE INEFFECTIVENESS
STANDARD IN PARENTAL-RIGHTS TERMINATION CASES
When a court is presented with an ineffectiveness claim as
a matter of first impression in a parental-termination case, it
must determine which ineffectiveness standard to adopt.264
Although a court in a jurisdiction that applies the Strickland
standard in criminal cases may be inclined to adopt Strickland
for parental-rights cases, that adoption should not be automatic.
As the Oregon Supreme Court pointed out in Geist, the
substantive and procedural rules applicable to criminal cases
have differed historically from the rules applicable to cases
standard would presume prejudice when there was an actual or constructive denial of the
right to be heard. Nonetheless, the opinions in Rogers, Thomas, and J. C. do not discuss the
presumption of prejudice.
261. 528 U.S. 470.
262. Id. at 482.
263. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659.
264. While it is possible for a legislature or a rule-making body to prescribe the
ineffectiveness standard in a statute or rule, I have found no jurisdiction in which that has
been done. It is through decisional law that standards for judging ineffectiveness have been
developed.
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involving children.265 Termination proceedings, while formal,
do not have all of the procedural safeguards of criminal
proceedings. With few exceptions, proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is not required in termination cases; the parents are not
judged by a jury; and there are often significant exceptions to
the application of the rules of evidence. The procedural
safeguards protecting a criminal defendant against an erroneous
determination of guilt may justify a stricter standard than that
necessary in parental-termination hearings where the procedural
safeguards are diminished, and so the risk of an erroneous
decision is greater than in a criminal case.
Instead of assuming that Strickland should apply to
termination cases because it applies to criminal cases, courts
should focus on the purpose of the requirement for effective
counsel in termination cases, and on how a particular
ineffectiveness standard will effect that purpose. Courts should
also consider whether there are additional purposes to be
achieved by the ineffectiveness standard. Finally, courts should
examine the standards adopted by other jurisdictions, assess
their practical impact, and compare their advantages and
disadvantages.
A. The Purpose of Effective Counsel in Parental-Termination
Cases
The reason generally given for requiring effective counsel
in parental-termination cases is the importance of the
fundamental rights at issue.266 A fair trial is necessary to protect
the basic parental interest at stake and to achieve a result upon
which everyone can rely. Effective counsel is essential to a fair
trial and to reducing the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the
parent's rights. Counsel plays a critical role in exposing any
weaknesses in the government's evidence and arguments, and in
presenting evidence and argument in support of the parent.
265. Geist, 796 P.2d at 1202.
266. See e.g. VF. v. State, 666 P.2d 42, 45 (Alaska 1983); Danforth v. St. Dept. of
Health & Welfare, 303 A.2d 794, 796-801 (Me. 1973); In re A.S.A., 852 P.2d 127, 129-30
(Mont. 1993); Michael F. v. State ex rel. Dept. of Human Servs. (In re D.D.F.), 801 P.2d
703, 706 (Okla. 1990).
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Because the purpose of effective counsel is a fair trial, the
ineffectiveness standard must be aimed at ensuring one. If the
sole purpose of the ineffectiveness standard is to achieve a fair
trial, then the standard is simple: If the level of counsel's
performance is inadequate, a fair trial has not been achieved, and
the judgment should be vacated. In other words, there would be
no separate prejudice prong because the prejudice suffered by
the parent is the lack of a fair trial.
A court could decide, however, that there are several
objectives to be obtained by an ineffectiveness standard, and that
the assurance of a fair trial is merely one among them. If so,
methods for accomplishing the other objectives will have to be
considered in deciding upon the ineffectiveness standard.
Secondary goals play an important role in the Strickland
standard. While Strickland is based on the belief that a fair trial
is the basis for the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel,267 the
Strickland standard is also aimed at securing at least two
additional goals. The first is to discourage the "proliferation of
ineffectiveness challenges" by unhappy litigants.268 Another is
to promote the efficiency of the process. Because of the number
of ineffectiveness claims in criminal cases, the Court wanted to
keep them from overwhelming the judicial system by both
discouraging the claims, and by requiring the courts to process
them in an efficient manner.
The legitimacy of these secondary goals in the criminal
arena cannot be disputed. Undoubtedly, there are a number of
criminal defendants who, once incarcerated, occupy their time
by attempting to vacate their convictions. The Court was rightly
concerned that an easily surmountable ineffectiveness standard
would flood the courts with their claims. Strickland's high
standard discourages those claims, and also effects the desirable
goal of processing them as efficiently as possible.
Limiting claims, efficiently processing claims, and
disallowing attacks on the competency of the lawyers who serve
the system are all worthwhile objectives of an ineffectiveness
standard for parental-termination cases, just as they are for
criminal cases. Whether these secondary objectives should
267. Id. at 686.
268. Id. at 690.
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receive such prominence, and whether they distract from the
primary goal of a fair trial, however, is open to debate. Also,
whether these same objectives should rise to the level of
importance in parental-termination proceedings that they have in
criminal cases is likewise subject to argument.
The prominence of secondary objectives in parental-
termination cases should be considered in light of the procedural
safeguards granted to criminal defendants that are not available
to parents. The lesser procedural safeguards afforded the parents
may make it more important for courts hearing parental-
termination claims to avoid reflexively adopting an
ineffectiveness standard that discourages claims or dooms most
of them to failure.
One secondary objective that a court should consider in the
termination arena, however, is finality. Because of the strong
societal interest in stabilizing the child's situation and allowing a
child who has been abused or neglected to be loved and cared
for by adoptive parents, both the finality of the termination order
and the speed with which finality is achieved are more important
in a termination judgment than they are in a criminal conviction.
To the extent that discouraging ineffectiveness claims helps to
achieve finality sooner rather than later, then, a court may want
to consider adopting mechanisms in the chosen standard that
discourage ineffectiveness claims.
B. Assessing Differences Between the Established Standards
and Considering Their Individual Advantages
In addition to reviewing the objectives to be achieved by
adopting an ineffectiveness standard, a court will also want to
assess the practical differences between those it is considering
because case outcomes under the Strickland standard differ from
those under the fundamental-fairness standard. The strong
presumption of counsel's adequacy in Strickland makes
jurisdictions applying it more likely to find an attorney's
performance adequate. Although the words used in both the
Strickland standard and Geist's fundamental-fairness standard to
describe the prejudice prong are similar, the fundamental-
fairness jurisdictions are more willing to find that the attorney's
inadequate performance has prejudiced the parent. Therefore, in
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assessing which of these two standards to adopt, a court should
expect to face more successful ineffectiveness claims under the
fundamental-fairness standard than under the Strickland
standard. Additionally, courts should consider the advantages
and disadvantages of the standards.
1. Advantages of the Strickland Standard
The advantages of the Strickland standard are several. First,
it has been clearly enunciated and refined by the Supreme Court.
Second, because it is the standard used in the large number of
Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness cases, it is known to both
judges and to attorneys who practice in the criminal courts,
some of whom also represent parents in termination
proceedings. Third, the Strickland standard is so often applied
that a large body of case law has developed on both its
performance and its prejudice prongs.269 This large body of
precedent guides attorneys and judges involved in termination
proceedings as to the quality of performance expected from
lawyers, and increases the courts' and the parties' ability to
predict the result of an ineffectiveness claim.
The Strickland standard also has drawbacks. It has been
widely criticized 270 for, among other things, encouraging-or at
least tolerating-a low level of attorney competence because so
little is expected of an attorney under Strickland. It is also
charged that this low level of competence results in the
underfunding of public-defender offices, contract programs, and
appointed-counsel systems, for if little is expected of defense
attorneys, funds do not have to be expended on attracting highly
qualified lawyers to these jobs, upgrading their status, or
269. See Burkoff & Burkoff, supra n. 25, a treatise devoted to Sixth Amendment
ineffectiveness cases.
270. See e.g. Martin C. Calhoun, Student Author, How to Thread the Needle: Toward a
Checklist-Based Standard for Evaluating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 77 Geo.
L.J. 413 (1988); Richard L. Gabriel, Student Author, The Strickland Standard for Claims of
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Emasculating the Sixth Amendment in the Guise of Due
Process, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1259 (1986); William J. Genego, The Future of Effective
Assistance of Counsel: Performance Standards and Competent Representation, 22 Am.
Crim. L. Rev. 180 (1984); Klein, supra n. 17; Michael Patrick O'Brien, student author,
Judicial Jabberwocky or Uniform Constitutional Protection? Strickland v. Washington and
National Standards for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 1985 Utah L. Rev. 723
(1985).
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supporting continuing-education programs that would raise their
level of competence. Strickland's history also demonstrates that
ineffectiveness claims brought where its standards apply are
seldom successful. While this may be a secondary purpose of
the Strickland standard, discouraging claims can be viewed as a
disadvantage if it keeps worthwhile claims out of court.
Strickland's prejudice prong, for example, excuses the
incompetence of an attorney when there is unassailed evidence
of the parent's unfitness. This is true even in cases in which the
trial record does not demonstrate the defenses to, or the
weaknesses of, the government's case because incompetent
counsel failed to make that demonstration.
2. Advantages of the Fundamental-Fairness Standard
The advantages and disadvantages of the fundamental-
fairness standard are somewhat the opposite of those for the
Strickland standard. The fundamental-fairness standard has not
been articulated by the Supreme Court, and it has been described
in slightly varying versions by state courts. It is not widely
applied, and is unfamiliar to judges and lawyers. Only a small
body of precedent applying it has developed. On the other hand,
the fundamental-fairness standard seems likely to raise the level
of attorney competence because it makes counsel more
responsible for ensuring that the parents receive a fair trial. It
can also be seen as more flexible because it is less doctrinaire
than the Strickland standard.
C. Considering Alternate Standards
In addition to the Strickland standard and the fundamental-
fairness standard, it may be useful for courts to look at the
standards developed by those few jurisdictions that have rejected
or modified Strickland for criminal cases. These modifications
have had the effect of making ineffectiveness claims slightly
easier to prove. 271 Commentators have also suggested standards
271. Hawaii rejected Strickland as being "unduly restrictive" and almost impossible to
meet. Briones v. State, 848 P.2d 966, 977 (Haw. 1993). Hawaii requires the criminal
defendant to point to specific errors or omissions that show counsel's lack of skill,
judgment, or diligence, and to demonstrate that the errors or omissions result "in either the
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
that they believe would better ensure a fair trial and that have the
secondary benefit of raising the level of attorney competence.
272
A variation of Strickland that a court may want to consider
is to adopt the performance prong of Strickland and to require
the parent to make a showing of prejudice, but to place the
burden on the state once the parent comes forward with specific
examples of substantial errors or omissions by counsel.2 3 This
would be analogous to the harmless-error rule adopted by the
Supreme Court when the error is of constitutional dimension.
274
Utilizing this traditional harmless-error analysis, if a parent
demonstrates that her attorney was incompetent, the burden
shifts to the government to show that the attorney's errors were
harmless. 275 One reason to adopt an ineffectiveness standard that
places the burden of showing lack of prejudice on the state is
because doing so emphasizes the fair-trial objective over the
objective of discouraging claims.
D. Summary
Appellate courts faced with choosing a framework to use
when deciding upon an ineffectiveness standard for termination
cases should start by considering the purposes they want to
achieve. A court should explore the standards adopted by other
jurisdictions and determine which will best accomplish the
purposes it hopes to achieve. In reviewing other standards, a
withdrawal or substantial impairment of a potentially meritorious defense." State v. Antone,
615 P.2d 101, 104 (Haw. 1980). New York's standard appears less exacting than
Strickland. Whether the defendant would have obtained a different result but for counsel's
error is relevant, but it is not dispositive. People v. Benevento, 697 N.E.2d 584, 588 (N.Y.
1998). Alaska's prejudice prong is said to be "significantly less demanding than
Strickland's." State v. Jones, 759 P.2d 558, 572 (Alaska App. 1988).
272. See e.g. Calhoun, supra n. 270, at 437-48.
273. See U.S. v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (indicating, before Strickland
was decided, that once the defendant showed a substantial error by counsel, the state had to
prove the absence of prejudice beyond a reasonable doubt).
274. Chapman v. Cal., 386 U.S. 18 (1967). The constitutional error in Chapman was the
prosecutor's comment on the defendants' failure to testify. Both the majority opinion
(written by Justice Black) and Justice Stewart's concurring opinion noted that prior cases
had held the right to counsel so fundamental that the denial of the right could never be
considered harmless. Id. at 827-28, 837 (Stewart, J., concurring).
275. An additional variation on this theme would be to substitute the burden of clear and
convincing evidence for the Chapman burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt because
the former burden is the one already used for termination cases in most states.
INEFFECTIVE-ASSISTANCE CLAIMS IN PARENTAL-RIGHTS CASES 235
court should look at the ways in which they have been applied
and assess actual case outcomes. Comparing the advantages and
disadvantages of the standards is also useful. Once a court has
made the analysis suggested by this framework and articulated
its reasons for choosing a standard, the resulting standard is
likely to accomplish both its primary objective-fair trials-and
any secondary purposes that the court considers important.
X. CONCLUSION
Because of the large number of cases in which the state
seeks to terminate parental rights, and because the parents in
such cases are usually represented by inexperienced, underpaid,
and overburdened counsel, the number of cases in which a
parent claims ineffective assistance of counsel is mounting. To
deal with the ineffectiveness claims in parental-termination
cases, courts must establish a procedure by which these claims
can be brought to their attention. That procedure must balance
the needs of the child with the interests of the parent and those
of the government.
The three procedures generally considered for this purpose
are direct appeal, post-judgment motions, and habeas corpus.
Because delay is adverse to the interests of all the parties, and
especially to the interests of the child, the procedure likely to
generate the least delay is the most advantageous. That
procedure will in most jurisdictions be a direct appeal with a
mechanism for remand when the appellate court is persuaded
that a remand to the trial court for further development of the
record is appropriate.
Appellate courts must also determine which standard of
ineffectiveness to apply to ineffectiveness claims in parental-
rights cases. No court should adopt the Strickland standard for
parental-termination cases simply because it applies Strickland
to criminal cases. Both the Strickland standard and the
fundamental-fairness standard have advantages and
disadvantages, all of which should be carefully examined by a
court facing its first ineffectiveness claim in a parental-rights
termination proceeding.

